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Abstract
This paper shows that differentiating driving costs by time of day and 
vehicle type help improve urban air quality, lower driving, and induce adoption 
of electric vehicles. By taking advantage of a congestion charge that imposed 
spatial and temporal variation in the cost of driving a conventional vehicle, 
we find that economic incentives lower traffic and concentrations of NO2. 
Exploiting a novel dataset on car ownership, we find that households exposed 
to congestion charging on their way to work were more likely to adopt an 
electric vehicle. We document strong heterogeneous patterns of electric vehicle 
adoption along several socioeconomic dimensions, including household type, 
income, age, education, work distance and public transit quality.
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1 Introduction
Transportation is a major contributor to urban air pollution and greenhouse gas
emissions. Despite substantial improvements in the energy efficiency of vehicles, a
long tradition of imposing air quality standards, and increased attention towards cli-
mate change mitigation, most countries around the world still struggle with the dual
challenge of poor ambient air quality and high levels of carbon emissions from trans-
portation (WHO, 2016; EEA, 2019).1 While more ambitious policies are needed to
curb emissions, imposing higher costs on driving is often met with substantial public
opposition, where critics point to unfavorable distributional properties of such poli-
cies. Previous studies also show that regulations aimed at mitigating air pollution
and other driving-related externalites can have unintended consequences (Davis,
2008; Auffhammer and Kellogg, 2011; Bento et al., 2014; Gibson and Carnovale,
2015), sometimes even leading to net welfare losses. Unintended consequences may
arise due to drivers’ substitution behavior, or by exploitation of policy loopholes.
Understanding the impacts of transportation policies aimed at mitigating local and
global externalities, as well as their distributional implications, is hence crucial in
order to facilitate an efficient and equitable low-carbon transition in the transporta-
tion sector.
In this paper, we combine highly detailed data on air pollution, traffic, and car
ownership to shed light on efficiency and equity impacts of a congestion charge that
increased the costs of driving gasoline and diesel vehicles during rush hours. While
command-and-control type of regulations such as low-emission zones and license
plate-based driving restrictions are often used to combat urban air pollution, with
mixed success (Davis, 2008; Wolff, 2014; Zhang et al., 2017; Zhai and Wolff, 2020),
market-based policies such as congestion charging have recently been implemented
in several major cities around the world (e.g., Stockholm, Zürich, Milan, London,
Singapore). Still, there are few empirical studies exploiting quasi-experimental vari-
ation to estimate effects of these types of policies on travel behavior and emissions.2
Are these types of market-based polices able to mitigate air pollution and induce a
shift towards greener modes of transportation? Or are drivers simply substituting
towards lower priced hours or roads, potentially leaving the total traffic volume un-
changed? What are the distributional consequences of increasing the price of driving
a high-emission vehicle, and to what extent are low-income households able to adapt
1According to the World Health Organization (WHO), over 90% of the world’s population live
in places where air quality levels exceeds the health-based guidelines (WHO, 2016).
2Notable exceptions include e.g., Gibson and Carnovale (2015) and Simeonova et al. (2019). A
more comprehensive literature review is provided towards the end of the introduction.
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by adopting costly electric vehicles exempted from congestion charging?
To examine these issues, we exploit a congestion charge implemented in 2016
in the second largest city in Norway (Bergen) that raised the price of entering the
city center toll cordon during rush hours by 80 %. The congestion charge only
applied to weekdays, and only to gasoline and diesel vehicles. While the main goal
of congestion charging is usually to lower traffic volumes during rush hours, the
Bergen congestion charge was to a large extent motivated by an aim of improving
air quality and to speed up the adoption of battery-electric vehicles (electric vehicles
in the following), which have been exempted from paying congestion charges and
road toll in Norway since 1997.3 The policy hence increased the relative price of
driving a high- vs. low-emission vehicle. Before 2010, access to high-quality electric
vehicles were limited, and polices favoring these cars likely had a modest impact
on adoption. However, with the roll-out of several high quality models over the
past decade, electric vehicles have become a feasible option, thereby expanding the
opportunity set of drivers (Figenbaum et al., 2015). Given the exceptionally high
market penetration of electric vehicles in Norway, the Bergen congestion charge
makes for an interesting study case to examine the margins of adjustment when
drivers face a time-of-day and vehicle-specific charge on driving.4
As a first step, we examine the overall effect of the congestion charge on traffic
volume and ambient air quality using high-frequency sensor and monitoring station
level data. To identify causal effects of the policy, we exploit two sources of variation
across time: pre and post policy and weekday vs. weekend.5 Results from the
empirical examination show a negative and significant effect on both traffic volume
and air pollution; increasing the rush hour rate of entering the toll cordon by around
80 % led to a 14 % decrease in cars entering the congestion zone during rush hours
and an 11 % reduction in concentrations of NO2 during midday hours.
6 While we
find evidence of inter-temporal substitution towards the 15-30 minutes right before
and after rush hours, as well as spatial substitution towards lower priced roads,
the overall change in traffic is dominated by the large reductions on treated roads
during rush hours. These findings suggest that drivers primarily substituted towards
other modes of transportation. Averaging effects over the course of a day, we find
3From 2019 and onward the policy was changed, and electric vehicles were charged with ∼20
percent of the standard rate. This policy change, however, is outside the time frame of our dataset.
4In the first quarter of 2019, over 50% of all new passenger vehicles sold in Norway were electric
vehicles; see elbil.no. In the year of the congestion charge implementation (2016), the share of
electric vehicles of all new passenger vehicles sold in Norway was around 16%.
5The congestion charge was only active during weekdays.
6We find similar sized effects for NO2 when applying a difference-in-differences specification
that exploits variation across cities instead of weekday vs. weekend. A similar specification is not
feasible for traffic volumes due to lack of comparable data across cities.
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that daily traffic volume on rush-hour priced roads decreased by around 4.8 % and
ambient levels of NO2 decreased by 6.5 % (or 3.1 µg/m
3). We find a similar-sized
percentage decline in PM10, but estimates are too noisy to draw firm conclusions.
As PM10 is largely generated from wear and tear from roads, tires and break blocks
rather than vehicle exhaust, a change in fleet composition towards electric vehicles
is likely to lower NO2 concentrations but not necessarily PM10.
To further examine behavioral responses to the congestion charge, we exploit a
novel data set that combines registry data on the full population of cars in Norway
with detailed socioeconomic information on households, including the neighborhood-
level location of individuals’ home and workplace. Combining this exceptionally
detailed data with information on the road network and the location of toll gates,
we are able to identify the toll payments faced by each individual household when
traveling between home and work – provided that they choose the shortest route.
Based on these datasets, we construct treatment and control groups in a triple
differences framework. Specifically, we define the treatment group as households
exposed to congestion charging on their way to work and the control group as
households where the work route does not have toll gates.7 We then compare the
treatment and control groups pre and post policy and across two similar-sized cities
in Norway (Bergen and Stavanger), where Stavanger serves as the “placebo” case.
By comparing the development of similar types of households across two cities, we
are able to control for differential, time-varying effects of the increased availability
of electric vehicles on households that pay and do not pay road toll. Identification
is further strengthened by the inclusion of neighborhood-year level fixed effects,
household level demographics and travel time between home and work with both
car and public transit.
Results from the empirical examination suggest that households respond to the
congestion charge by substituting towards electric vehicles. We find that households
exposed to the Bergen congestion charge were around 4.2 percentage points more
likely to adopt an electric vehicle. This estimated treatment effect explains around
1/3 of the increase in electric vehicle adoption in the treatment group from 2014
to 2017.8 Further, we find that the positive effect on electric vehicle adoption is
mirrored by a negative effect on the adoption of gasoline and diesel vehicles, leading
to a close to zero effect on the total number of cars owned by a household. This
7This definition serves as a proxy for the overall costs faced by households from congestion
charging.
8From the end of 2014 to the end of 2017, the share of toll-paying commuters in Bergen that
owned an electric vehicle increased by 13 percentage points, from 4.7 percent to 17.7 percent. In
the absence of the congestion charge, we predict that the electric vehicle share in 2017 would have
been 13.5 percent.
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suggests that households, on average, replaced their fossil fuel car by an electric one.
Examining heterogeneous effects, we find strong gradients along several socioeco-
nomic dimensions. While the policy had no effect on electric vehicle adoption among
households in the lowest income quintile, the electric vehicle share for households in
the highest income quintile increased by around 7 percentage points as a consequence
of the policy. We also find that treatment effects are larger for university-educated
couples with kids, and for households with a longer work commute and poor public
transit quality. The latter implies that the quality of transportation substitutes
plays a key role in households’ adaptation responses. While the heterogeneous ef-
fects may be explained by differences in preferences, parts may be due to financial
constraints in purchasing an electric vehicle.
Overall, our findings on car ownership suggest that congestion charging combined
with exemptions for electric vehicles can be a powerful tool to promote electric
vehicle adoption, but that there are systematic differences in how households respond
to the policy. Back-of-the-envelope welfare calculations suggest that the policy led
to a net welfare gain with a benefit to cost ratio of around 3:1.
The magnitude of our treatment estimates must be seen in context of Norway’s
other existing electric vehicle incentives, such as exemptions from purchasing tax and
value-added tax. These strong financial incentives have contributed to an exception-
ally high market share of electric vehicles in Norway and a relatively well-developed
charging infrastructure. In absence of these favorable conditions, we would likely
have seen a lower effect of the congestion charge on electric vehicle adoption. De-
spite the specific features of our research context, we argue that our findings may
help shed light on expected impacts of congestion charging in other countries in a
future scenario where electric vehicles are more competitive to internal combustion
engine vehicles, e.g. due to policies or technological improvements, and the charging
infrastructure more developed than today.
Our paper complements the empirical literature on the effects of transportation
polices on air pollution, congestion, and other driving-related externalities. Previous
studies have shown that e.g., low emission zones, road tolls and congestion charges
can help improve urban air quality (Wolff, 2014; Gibson and Carnovale, 2015; Fu
and Gu, 2017; Gehrsitz, 2017; Simeonova et al., 2019; Pestel and Wozny, 2019; Zhai
and Wolff, 2020), with resulting health benefits such as lower asthma rates in chil-
dren (Simeonova et al., 2019), lower infant mortality (Currie and Walker, 2011),
and fewer hospital admissions related to chronic cardiovascular and respiratory dis-
eases (Pestel and Wozny, 2019). While these studies provide important estimates
on environmental and health effects of transportation policies, very few studies com-
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bine highly detailed data with a quasi-experimental design to examine underlying
mechanisms through which individuals respond to these policies, as well as how
these mechanisms differ across households. The majority of papers also focus on
command-and-control instruments; by contrast we provide estimates on the effects
of a marked-based policy implemented in several major cities over the past decade.
Our paper also contributes to a small but growing quasi-experimental literature
on electric vehicle adoption. Existing studies focus on the effects of purchasing
subsidies (Muehlegger and Rapson, 2018; Clinton and Steinberg, 2019), charging
infrastructure (Li et al., 2017) and low emission zones (Wolff, 2014) on new vehicle
registrations, usually at the zip-code, metropolitan, or state level. By contrast, we
examine effects of a congestion charge paired with electric vehicle exemptions on
household-level car ownership. Compared to previous studies, we use exceptionally
detailed data, were we are able to locate the residence and workplace of each indi-
vidual living in Norway. This allows us to construct a policy exposure measure that
vary substantially across space and time, which helps to develop a more credible
identification strategy. Further, by using data on households’ car portfolio rather
than just new car sales, we are able to examine whether the policy increased or
decreased the total number of cars – a crucial aspect to understand the net environ-
mental and climate benefits of electric vehicle incentives.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides back-
ground information on the policy and the broader institutional setting. Section 3
describes the data and results for pollution and traffic. Section 4 describes data and
results for household-level transportation behavior. Section 5 provides a discussion
of the net welfare effects and distributional concerns. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
The congestion charge in Bergen was announced in February 2015 and implemented
one year later, on February 1st 2016; see Table 1. The congestion charge was
electronically collected via the existing automated toll gates in and around the city
center of Bergen; see Figure 1. Before implementation, small passenger vehicles
passing the toll cordon paid an amount of NOK 25 (∼$3) irrespective of time of day.
After the introduction of congestion pricing, small passenger vehicles faced a rush-
hour rate of NOK 45 (∼$5.4) in the hours 06:30-09:00 and 14:30-16:30, equivalent
to an 80 % price increase. The rush hour rates were only active on weekdays.
Rates in non-rush hours were lowered to NOK 19 (∼$2.3), representing a 24 % price
decrease. Vehicles were charged when entering the toll cordon. If a vehicle passed
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Table 1: Congestion charging in the city of Bergen
Date implemented Feb 1, 2016
Date announced Feb 18, 2015
Morning rush 06:30-09:00
Afternoon rush 14:30-16:30
Price pre Feb 1, 2016 NOK 25 (∼$3)
Price post Feb 1, 2016: rush hour NOK 45 (∼$5.4)
Price post Feb 1, 2016: non-rush NOK 19 (∼$2.3)
Notes: Rates are given in NOK. 10 NOK ≈ 1 EUR and ≈ 1.2 USD. Rates
correspond to the levels at the time of implementation and reflect rates faced
by small passenger vehicles (< 3500 kg) . For large vehicles (> 3500 kg)
the price was 50 NOK before Feb 1st 2016, and 90 NOK during rush hours
(38 NOK outside rush hours) after policy implementation. Battery electric
vehicles were exempted from the congestion charge and toll rates throughout
the period analyzed. Hybrid electric vehicles were subject to the same rates
as internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs). Appendix Figure A.3 shows
the development of toll rates in Bergen over the period 2005 to 2017.
the toll cordon several times within an hour, it was only charged once.9 Battery-
electric vehicles were exempted from toll rates both before and after the introduction
of the congestion charge. The congestion charge hence further increased the relative
cost of driving a diesel or gasoline vehicle compared to a battery-electric vehicle.10
While the main goal of rush hour pricing is usually to mitigate congestion, the
introduction of the Bergen congestion charge was to a large extent motivated by
air quality concerns. In the years leading up to implementation, Bergen together
with a handful of larger cities in Norway struggled with poor urban air quality, and
in 2015 Norway was convicted in the EFTA court for violating EU’s ambient air
quality standards in several parts of the country.11 The majority of the violations
were linked to excess concentrations of NO2 in urban areas, where exhaust from road
traffic is usually a major source; see Section 3.1 for details. As a consequence of the
court decision, Norway was required to initiate measures to meet the requirements
of the EU Air Quality Directive.
Beyond meeting air quality requirements, the introduction of the congestion
charge was also seen as an instrument to lower CO2 emissions and facilitate the shift
towards greener modes of transportation. As almost 98 % of Norway’s electricity
9There was also a monthly cap on the overall cost per vehicle. Once the cap was reached, the
vehicle was allowed to enter the toll cordon free of charge. However, this cap was set too high to
be binding for regular commuters.
10See e.g., NPRA (2018) for more details on the policy, and for a descriptive analysis of traffic
volumes after the introduction of the policy. Congestion charging has also been implemented in four
other cities in Norway; see Appendix Table A.1. In this paper, we focus on the Bergen congestion
charge as we either lack sufficient air pollution data on the other cities, or lack information on car
ownership for the post period.
11See e.g., regjeringen.no and nrk.no.
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Notes: The map shows toll gates, weather stations, and pollution monitoring stations in and around the city
centre of Bergen. The only pollution monitoring station with a sufficiently long time series to use in the
analysis is the monitoring station labeled as Danmarks plass. See Appendix A for additional maps of Bergen
and the road network.
production is renewable (Statistics Norway, 2020), electric vehicles cause very low
indirect CO2 emissions from driving. Norway has an ambitious goal of increasing
the market share of electric vehicles to 100 % by 2025 (NTP, 2017, p. 224), and the
congestion charge exemption was one of many benefits granted to electric vehicle
owners over the time period analyzed. At the national level, electric vehicles are
exempted from purchase taxes and VAT. At the local level, electric vehicles benefit
from exemptions from road toll and congestion charges, access to bus lanes, free
parking, and free charging. See Appendix Table A.3 for a complete list of electric
vehicle incentives.
The strong incentives have contributed to an exceptionally high market share of
electric vehicles in Norway - the highest in the world in 2017 (IEA, 2018). The high
share has been facilitated by a dramatic increase in the supply of electric vehicle
models since 2010.12 While many of the policies promoting electric vehicles have
been in place since the 1990s, their impact likely increased as several high-quality
12See Figenbaum et al. (2015) for an overview of electric vehicles introduced in the Norwegian
market.
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electric vehicle models became available. When estimating effects of the congestion
charge on individual-level behavior, it will therefore be important to control for the
potentially differential time trends across households with different levels of exposure
to electric vehicle benefits. For instance, households paying road toll on their way
to work will have a stronger incentive to adopt an electric vehicle, and the response
is likely to increase as more electric vehicles become available - also in the absence
of an increase in road toll. In this paper, we aim to disentangle the effect of the
Bergen congestion charge from other policy and technology trends by constructing
a control group that faced similar local and national policies and incentives - with
the exception of congestion charging.
The introduction of congestion charges in Norway has sparked a lot of public
discontent, where critics often point to unfavorable distributional properties of the
policy. As all drivers face the same rate, those from lower-income households will
necessarily spend a larger share of their overall budget if similarly exposed to the
congestion charge. Critics have also pointed to the lack of high-quality substitutes
for many households, locking them into existing behavioral patterns. Purchasing
a battery-electric vehicle to avoid road toll and congestion charges is still out of
reach for many households – despite the large tax exemptions. In the spring and
summer of 2019, there were several mass protests around the country against higher
toll rates and congestion charging, which resulted in the formation of a new, single-
cause political party pledging to remove all toll gates. The new “road toll party” got
a substantial share of the votes in the local elections in the fall of 2019, leading to the
cancellation of planned congestion charges and new toll gates.13 Despite claims of
the policy disproportionately harming low-income households, there is little evidence
on how individuals actually adapted to the policy and to what extent they seemed
to be locked into behavioral patterns due to e.g., income and limited public transit
options.
3 Part I: air pollution and traffic volume
What was the effect of the congestion charge on rush hour and daily traffic? And
to what extent did the policy improve ambient air quality? In the following, we
examine these questions using high-frequency data from traffic sensors and pollution
monitoring stations.
13See e.g. https://www.nrk.no/osloogviken/bomringen-i-drammen-skrotes-1.14560632
(accessed September 11, 2020; Norwegian only).
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3.1 Data and descriptives
3.1.1 Traffic volume
To investigate effects of the congestion charge on traffic, we collect sensor level
data on traffic volume and composition from the local road toll company in Bergen
(Ferde). A map of the 14 automated toll gates, which indicate the congestion
charging area, is provided in Figure 1. The sensor level data contains information
on all cars passing the automated toll road gates in the period 2014 to 2018, with a
15-minute resolution. The number of cars within each 15 minute interval is further
split into vehicles weighing less than 3.5 tonnes (referred to as “passenger vehicles”)
and vehicles weighing 3.5 tonnes or more (refereed to as “trucks”).14 In the main
analysis, we focus on the total number of cars passing any toll gate in or out of
Bergen in a given time period. By aggregating traffic to the city level, we eliminate
the toll gate dimension of the data and are left with a high-frequency time series
of total traffic.15 Further, we focus on a period covering two years before and two
years after the congestion charge was implemented, i.e., Feb 1 2014 to Feb 1 2018.
This ensures that toll rates were constant in the pre-treatment period; see Appendix
Figure A.3.
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Notes: Figures show the average number of vehicles passing the toll cordon over the course of a day based
on 15 minute intervals. Panel (a) shows averages for weekdays (Monday-Friday) and panel (b) shows averages
for the weekend (Saturday-Sunday). Dashed lines indicate averages for the 730 days (2 years) prior to policy
implementation. Solid lines indicate averages for the 730 days (2 years) post policy implementation. Gray shaded
areas indicate rush hours (06:30-09:00 and 14:30-16:30). Note that the congestion charge was not active during
weekends. See Appendix Figure B.1 for traffic volume presented separately for passenger vehicles and trucks. See
Appendix Figure B.2 for similar figures using a period of 365 days pre/post policy implementation. See Appendix
Figure B.3 for traffic volume 365 days pre and post Feb 1 2015 (“placebo intervention”).
14Note that vehicles weighing less than 3.5 tonnes also consist of taxis, vans, and service vehicles.
Vehicles weighing 3.5 tonnes or more also consist of buses and emergency vehicles in addition to
trucks.
15Main results are not sensitive to the level of aggregation, as shown in Appendix B.2.3.
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Figure 2 shows how vehicles passing the toll gates are distributed over the course
of a day two years before (dashed line) and two years after (solid line) the conges-
tion charge was implemented. Panel (a) clearly indicates that traffic volumes peak
around rush hours, and that rush hour traffic declined in the two years after policy
implementation.16 The figure also shows a small increase in the number of cars
right before and after rush hours, suggesting that the policy induced some drivers to
change their departure time to avoid the increased cost. However, this substitution
towards non-rush hours seems to be limited to a 15 minute interval before and after
rush hours. The traffic pattern during weekends, when the congestion charge was
not active, looks very similar in the two years before and after the policy; see panel
(b) in Figure 2.17
3.1.2 Air pollution
To examine effects of the policy on ambient air quality, we collect hourly data on
atmospheric pollution for the period 2014-2018 from the Norwegian Institute for
Air Research (NILU), which operates a number of air monitors across Norway. Air
pollution is measured as micrograms per cubic meter of air (µg/m3). Figure 1 shows
a map with the location of monitoring stations in the inner city of Bergen. While
there are several monitoring stations located within the congestion zone, only one
monitoring station has a sufficiently long time series to examine effects on the policy
(the station labeled Danmarks plass). We hence limit the analysis to this station
only when estimating effects on air pollution.
In the analysis, we focus one two key air pollutants: nitrogen dioxides (NO2)
and particulate matter with a diameter between 2.5 and 10 micrometers (PM10).
18
NO2 is one of a group of highly reactive gases known as nitrogen oxides (NOx).
The most important source of NO2 in Norway is exhaust from vehicles with an
internal combustion engine, i.e., gasoline and diesel vehicles (NILU, 2019).19 High
ambient levels of NO2 is usually an urban phenomenon, and in the period analyzed
several of the larges cities in Norway violated the national air quality standards
for NO2. Epidemiological studies have documented several adverse health effects of
exposure to NO2, such as aggravation of asthma and bronchitis, impaired respiratory
functions, and mortality (see e.g., Lipsett et al., 1997; Shima and Adachi, 2000).
16The reduced traffic during rush hours are primarily driven by passenger vehicles; see Appendix
Figure B.1.
17See Appendix B.1 for additional descriptives.
18These are the two pollutants most relevant to road traffic, and are also the ones where we
have sufficient data to perform the analysis. An overview of the relative contribution of different
sources to six different air pollutants is provided in Appendix Table A.2.
19Other less important sources of NO2 are manufacturing industry and ship traffic.
10
Recent studies also suggest that NO2 have adverse health effects also for ambient
levels well below national ambient air quality standards (Simeonova et al., 2019;
Breivik et al., 2020).
Particulate matter is a mixture of solid particles and liquid droplets such as
dust, dirt, soot, or smoke. PM is usually divided into two categories according to
the size of the particles. PM10 refers to particles with diameters between 10 and
2.5 micrometers.20 The most important sources of PM10 in urban areas in Norway
are wear and tear from roads, car tires and break blocks, sand added to roads to
increase friction of icy surfaces in the winter, and wood-fired ovens (NILU, 2019).
The epidemiological literature has documented several adverse health effects from
exposure to PM10 and PM2.5, such as premature death in people with heart and
lung disease, aggravated asthma, and decreased lung growth and lung function in
children (see e.g., Avol et al., 2001).
Figure 3 shows how ambient levels of NO2 and PM10 vary over the course of 24
hours in the two years before (dashed line) and after (solid line) policy implemen-
tation. Gray shaded areas indicate rush hours. Both pollutants show a peak during
the weekday morning rush, with a more pronounced peak for NO2. By comparing
the average pollution levels pre and post policy, we see that there is a clear decline
in ambient air pollution on both weekdays and weekends. However, the decline in
µg/m3 seems to be largest for weekdays.21 To put the levels of air pollution into
context, the WHO Air Quality Guidelines for NO2 and PM10 are 40 µg/m
3 annual
mean and 20 µg/m3 annual mean, respectively (WHO, 2006). See Appendix C.1 for
additional descriptives and summary statistics.
3.1.3 Weather
To control for the effects of weather on traffic and pollution outcomes, we col-
lect monitor-level weather data from the Norwegian Meteorological Institute for the
years 2014-2018. We focus on hourly measures of temperature, precipitation, wind
speed, and wind direction. The weather data is linked to a pollution monitoring
station by calculating the inverse distance weighted average of observations from all
weather stations within a 50 kilometer radius of a pollution monitoring site. Based
on hourly wind data, we construct four wind direction categories.22 Additionally,
20PM2.5 refers to particles with a diameter of 2.5 micrometers or smaller.
21If we restrict the sample to one year pre and post policy implementation, there appears to be
no reduction in NO2 on weekends and a large reduction on weekdays; see Appendix Figure C.2.
For PM10 there is a similar, but less striking pattern.
22Categorization is based on wind direction in degrees. Northern ∈ [0-45] and (315,360], Eastern
∈ (45,135], Southern ∈ (135,225], Western ∈ (225,315].
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Figure 3: Air pollution two years before and after Feb 1 2016
(a) Weekday NO2 (b) Weekend NO2
(c) Weekday PM10 (d) Weekend PM10
Notes: Figure shows average ambient air pollution over the course of a day for the pollution monitoring station
located at Danmarksplass in Bergen. Values are based on 60 minute intervals. Panels (a) and (c) show averages for
weekdays (Monday-Friday) and panels (b) and (d) show averages for weekends (Saturday-Sunday). Dashed lines
indicate averages for the two years prior to policy implementation (Feb 1 2016). Solid lines indicate averages for
the two years post policy implementation. Gray shaded areas indicate rush hours. Note that congestion charging
is not active during weekends. Pollution is measured as micrograms per cubic meter of air(µg/m3). See Appendix
Figure C.3 for ambient air pollution one year pre and post Feb 1 2015 (”Placebo intervention”). See Appendix
Figure C.2 for similar figures using a period of one year pre and post policy intervention.
we collect data on temperature inversion episodes in Bergen from the Nansen En-
vironmental and Remote Sensing Center.23 The dataset contains temperature for
Bergen recorded at different altitudes, allowing us to identify inversion episodes, i.e.,
periods in which the temperature is increasing in altitude. As cold air is heavier
than warm, air inversion episodes tend to reduce air circulation close to the surface
and thus trap the pollutants produced by vehicles (and other sources) close to the
ground. In the 2 years pre and post policy, inversion episodes occurred for around
4 % of the hourly observations; see Appendix C.1.




In this subsection, we provide an empirical framework to help estimate a causal effect
of the congestion charge on traffic volume and air pollution. While the descriptive
evidence presented in Section 3.1 suggest a decline in traffic and air pollution after
the introduction of the congestion charge, the reduction might have been due to
other factors than the policy, such as weather conditions, the use of wood-fired ovens,
road construction, the supply of low and zero emission vehicles, etc. To identify the
causal (short-run) effect of the policy, we employ a differences-in-differences (DiD)
framework, where we exploit the fact that rush hour charges were not active during
weekends.24 By defining weekdays as our treatment observations and weekends as
our control observations, we mitigate the risk of estimates being confounded by other
factors that change over time and affect traffic or pollution simultaneously. The
key identifying assumption is that changes in omitted time-varying variables, such
as unobserved technological trends, economic activity and local policy initiatives,
affect weekday and weekend traffic and air pollution similarly.
Our main regression equation can be written as:
yikt = βpostt × weekdayt +X ′itγ + λym + θdi + εikt, (1)
where yikt denotes the outcome of type k observed at time interval i on date t; X
′
it is
a vector of weather controls; λym denotes year×month fixed effects; θdi denotes day-
of-week×time-of-day fixed effects; and εikt is the idiosyncratic error term. Finally,
postt is a dummy variable equal to 1 after February 1st 2016, and weekdayt is a
dummy variable equal to 1 during weekdays, meaning that β is the coefficient of
interest. Seasonal variation and long-term time trends are absorbed by λym, while
pre-policy weekday-weekend differences are absorbed by θdi. Thus, the variation left
to identify β̂ is the pre-post difference between weekdays and weekends. In the main
specifications standard errors are clustered at the weekly level.
For the main traffic regressions, yikt denotes the total traffic volume of type
k ∈ {all vehicles, passenger vehicles, trucks} passing the toll cordon in Bergen dur-
ing a 15 minute interval. For air pollution regressions, yikt denotes the concentration
of pollutant k ∈ {NO2, PM10} measured at hourly intervals. Both regression spec-
ifications include the same vector of weather controls.25 Our main specification is
24Looking at Figure 2, panel (b) it does not seem like the traffic pattern during weekends changed
visibly pre vs. post policy implementation.
25While weather controls are arguably more important in the air pollution regressions, weather
conditions may also affect traffic volume. For consistency reasons, we use the same vector of
weather controls in both regressions: three polynomials of air temperature; two polynomials of
precipitation; the interaction of temperature and precipitation; two polynomials of wind speed;
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based on a sample consisting of 730 days (two years) before and after the policy
implementation. This is the longest time interval our data allows that ensures that
seasonal trends in traffic or pollutants are balanced pre and post. We remove ir-
regular days, such as vacations and summer months. Alternative specifications and
robustness checks are provided in Appendix B.2.
We consider our DiD strategy to give us a conservative treatment estimate, for
at least two reasons. First, as some pollutants can stay in the air for several hours
(depending on weather conditions among other factors), a policy-induced reduction
in weekday pollution may lower ambient levels of air pollution on weekends as well.
In the presence of such positive spillovers from weekdays to the weekend, we expect
our DiD strategy to downward bias treatment effects. Second, if the policy leads
to behavioral changes that are carried over to weekends, our treatment estimate
will difference out these effects. For instance, one might suspect that the policy
led to more cycling, walking and use of public transit, and that individuals that got
accustomed to these modes of transportation were also more inclined to change their
behavior during weekends. Furthermore, if households bought electric vehicles as
a response to the policy, they likely also used these vehicles during weekends. Our
DiD estimate should therefore be interpreted as a lower bound on the causal effect
of the policy.26
3.3 Results on traffic volume
Figure 4 displays the estimated treatment effects of the policy, where estimates are
allowed to vary by 15 minute increments. Comparing these 96 different treatment
effects allows us to identify the time intervals with the largest treatment effects,
as well as explicitly examine intertemporal substitution. The figure clearly follows
the same pattern as Figure 2; traffic shows a sharp decline during the morning and
evening rush hours and an increase in the 15-30 minutes before and after rush hours.
In the remaining hours of the day, the effect of the congestion charge on traffic is
close to zero. These findings imply that the policy worked as intended, by inducing
drivers to either change their mode of transportation or substitute towards lower
priced hours. The increase in traffic right before and after rush hours are clearly
dominated by the reduction during rush hours, implying an overall reduction in
daily traffic.
four dummies for wind direction (north, south, east and west) as well as their interaction with
wind speed; and finally, a dummy for inversion episodes. We estimate two sets of each of these
weather control variables; one for weekdays and one for weekends.
26For air pollution, the data permits us to present an alternative DiD estimate based on differ-
ences across cities and over time; see Appendix C.3 for details.
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Notes: Figure plots treatment effects estimated from from equation 1, where regressions are run separately for each
15 minute increment. Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are not adjusted for multiple
hypothesis testing. Gray shaded areas indicate rush hours. Traffic is measured as the total number of cars passing
the toll cordon every 15 minutes. Standard errors are clustered at the week level.
Table 2 shows the average daily treatment effect (column 1), as well as treatment
effects for five different time periods of the day (columns 2-6). Overall, the congestion
charge led to a 4.8 % reduction in daily traffic volume during weekdays (around 78
vehicles per 15 minute interval, or 7,456 vehicles per day).27 Note that this estimated
effect incorporates intertemporal spillovers within a day. Columns (2)-(4) indicate
that traffic during rush hours was significantly reduced by 14.4 % (around 447
vehicles per 15 minute interval). Column (5) shows a 9 % increase in traffic in the
30 minutes before and after the morning and evening rush, indicating intertemporal
substitution. Column (6) shows a small reduction in traffic during other non-rush
hours (1.3 %) that is significant at the 10 % level.28 See Appendix Table B.1 for
results split by passenger vehicles and trucks.
To illustrate the magnitude of the intertemporal substitution, we translate the
15 minute effects to the total increase or decrease in the number of vehicles within a
given time period. While rush hour traffic decreased by (447×18 quarters =) 8,046
cars, there was an increase of (207.8×8 quarters =) 1,662 cars in the 30 minutes
2777.67 cars per quarter × 96 quarters per day = 7,456 cars per day.
28This might be related to the small reduction in fees outside rush hours. However, the reduction
in fees outside rush hours also applies to weekends, and will therefore to some degree be differenced
out. Note, however, that traffic during weekends did not seem to decrease (see Figure 2. Thus, it
seems like the reduction in fees outside rush hours had limited impact on overall traffic volume.
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Table 2: DiD estimates on traffic volume. 2 years pre/post
Rush hours Non-rush hours
Dependent variable: All day All Morning Evening +/-30 min Other
# vehicles/15 minute interval (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × weekday -77.67∗∗∗ -447.0∗∗∗ -445.7∗∗∗ -436.9∗∗∗ 207.8∗∗∗ -15.42∗
(9.889) (23.18) (29.33) (25.68) (19.89) (7.971)
Observations 87518 16416 9122 7294 7294 63808
Mean depvar (pre, weekday) 1632 3104 3239 2936 2316 1175
Change (%) -4.76 -14.40 -13.76 -14.88 8.97 -1.31
Weather controls (X ′itγ ) X X X X X X
Month × year FE (λym) X X X X X X
Day-of-week × time-of-day FE (θdi) X X X X X X
Notes: Table shows results from 6 separate regressions. Dependent variable is vehicles passing toll gates in Bergen
during a 15 minute interval. Post×weekday refers to the β coefficient estimated from Equation 1. Column headings
indicate the sample used in each regression. “Rush hours” refer to the intervals 06:30-08:59 (morning) and 14:30-
16:29 (evening). For non-rush hours, “+/- 30 min” refers to the 30 minute intervals right before and after rush
hours. “Other” refers to the remaining non-rush hours (i.e., 9:30-13:59 and 17:00-05:59). Sample is restricted to
730 days pre and post policy implementation. Standard errors clustered at the weekly level in parentheses. *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are not adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing.
before and after rush hours. If there had been a zero increase in traffic during these
30 minutes before and after rush hours, we would have seen a 5.8 % decrease in daily
traffic instead of the actual 4.8 % decrease.29 Drivers’ substitution towards lower
priced hours hence lowers the daily treatment effect by around 1 percentage point.
In Appendix B.2, we show that our baseline results on traffic are robust to: (i)
trimming the sample to one year pre and post policy, (ii) using three different aggre-
gation levels of traffic, (iii) using different levels of fixed effects, and (iv) performing
placebo tests using Feb 1 2015 as the treatment date.
In Appendix B.3, we examine potential spatial substitution towards roads outside
the congestion zone. There are primarily two detours drivers can make to avoid the
toll cordon: either when driving from north to south, or from south to west. Using
hourly data from traffic sensors mounted in the roads, we find evidence of spatial
substitution behavior during rush hours, in particular in the south-west direction.
We estimate that the spatial spillover is around 1054 vehicles per day for the two
road sections combined. This substitution pattern does not necessarily represent
an undesirable effect of the policy, as traffic is diverted away from the areas where
it likely imposes a larger impact on traffic flows and air quality. If we take these
spatial spillovers into account, however, the estimated daily reduction in traffic
during weekdays changes from 4.8 % (baseline estimate) to 4.1 %.30 Unfortunately,
29Calculations: (7,456-1,662)/(1,632×96) = 5.8 % reduction in daily traffic.
30The net daily reduction in traffic in and around the congestion zone is around (7,456–1,054=)
6,402 vehicles, which corresponds to a (6,402/1,632×96=) 4.1 % reduction in daily traffic.
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our data does not allow us to examine whether the deterred trips are not taking
place at all, or whether people are substituting towards other modes of transport
such as public transit, walking, cycling or car pooling.
3.4 Results on air pollution
Figure 5 shows hourly DiD estimates for NO2 and PM10. From Figure 5 panel (a),
we see that the congestion charge led to significant reductions in NO2 most hours
between 6 am and 5 pm. The largest reductions occur in the time period right after
the morning rush. As air pollutants can stay in the air for a period of time after they
are released, we do not expect to see the same sharp differences between rush hours
and non-rush hours as in Figure 2.31 If we compare the estimated treatment effects
to the raw means presented in Figure 3, the estimated effects are very similar to
the observed difference in NO2 concentrations before and after the policy, indicating
that most of the change in NO2 over time can be attributed to the congestion charge.
Figure 5: DID estimates on NO2 and PM10 by 60 min. intervals. 2 years pre/post
(a) NO2 (b) PM10
Notes: Figure plots the coefficient β estimated from Equation 1. Each coefficient reflects the estimated treatment
effect from a separate regression, where the sample is restricted to the 1 hour interval indicated on the x-axis.
Sample period is restricted to 2 years before and 2 years after policy implementation (Feb 1 2016). Gray shaded
areas indicate rush hours. Pollution is measured as micrograms per cubic meter of air (µg/m3). See Appendix
Figure C.4 for results based on a sample restricted to 1 year before and after policy intervention. See Appendix
Figure C.6 for ”placebo” estimates based on 1 year before and after Feb 1 2015.
Table 3, panel (a) shows average daily treatment effects for NO2 (column 1)
together with average treatment effects for 5 different time intervals (columns 2-6).
The coefficient in column (1) suggests that the congestion charge lowered NO2 con-
centrations by 3.1 µg/m3 on average during a day, corresponding to a 7 % reduction.
The effect is driven by reductions during and between rush hours; NO2 concentra-
tions were 6.8 µg/m3 lower during rush hours, corresponding to a 11 % reduction,
31The length of the period air pollutants stay in the air will vary with weather conditions, such
as precipitation, wind speed and inversion episodes.
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while estimated effects on NO2 during the evening and night time are close to zero
and insignificant.32
Table 3: DID estimates on NO2 and PM10. 2 years pre/post
24 hours Daytime Midday Rush Evening Night
Dependent variable: 00-23 05-22 06-17 6-9,14-16 18-23 00-05
ambient air pollution (µg/m3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: NO2
Post × weekday -3.064∗∗ -4.334∗∗∗ -6.719∗∗∗ -6.813∗∗∗ -0.182 0.323
(1.369) (1.576) (1.634) (1.658) (1.915) (1.300)
Observations 21438 16041 10637 6227 5403 5398
Mean depvar (pre-weekday) 47.01 55.06 60.86 63.78 42.30 24.58
Change (%) -6.52 -7.87 -11.04 -10.68 -0.43 1.32
Panel B: PM10
Post × weekday -1.185 -1.690∗ -2.084∗ -1.735 -0.868 0.565
(0.809) (0.955) (1.163) (1.115) (0.850) (0.699)
Observations 21624 16219 10794 6314 5429 5401
Mean depvar (pre-weekday) 18.81 21.02 22.29 21.76 18.67 12.01
Change (%) -6.30 -8.04 -9.35 -7.97 -4.65 4.70
Weather controls (X ′itγ) X X X X X X
Month×year FE (λym) X X X X X X
Day of week×time-of-day FE (θdi) X X X X X X
Notes: Table shows results from 12 separate regressions. Dependent variable is ambient air pollution measured
as mean levels of NO2 or PM10 (µg/m3) during a 60 minute interval. Post×weekday refers to the coefficient β
estimated from equation 1. Column headings indicate the sample used in each regression. Rush hours refer to the
intervals 06:00-09:59 (morning) and 14:00-16:59 (evening). Sample is restricted to two years pre and post policy
implementation. Standard errors clustered at the weekly level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Panel (b) in Figure 5 and Table 3 present results for PM10. While the estimated
treatment effects show a relatively similar pattern as for NO2, with reductions dur-
ing the daytime, the imprecisely estimated coefficients make it hard to draw firm
conclusions. There are several reasons why we would expect PM10 estimates to be
more noisy and smaller in magnitude than the NO2 estimates. First, PM10 is influ-
enced by multiple sources, and is therefore not as tightly linked to traffic as NO2.
In particular, during wintertime PM10 is heavily influenced by the use of wood-fired
ovens. Second, as the main source of traffic-related PM10 is wear and tear from
roads, tires and break blocks rather than exhaust, a potential policy-induced in-
crease in the share of electric vehicles during weekdays would likely have little effect
on PM10. By contrast, traffic-related NO2 is primarily generated from exhaust and
would therefore be more influenced by a change in the composition of the car fleet.
In Appendix C.2, we show that the negative and significant effect of congestion
32Our rush hour estimate of -11 % corresponds to a road toll elasticity of air pollution of around
-0.14. This figure is relatively similar to the toll elasticity reported in Fu and Gu (2017) (-0.15),
where the authors estimate the impact of highway toll on an air pollution index reflecting NO2,
PM10 and SO2.
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charging on concentrations of NO2 is robust to: (i) trimming the sample to one year
pre and post policy, (ii) using different levels of fixed effects, (iii) using different
combinations of weather controls, and (iv) performing placebo tests using Feb 1
2015 as the intervention date. The same robustness checks also confirm a negative
but non-significant effect on PM10.
As discussed in Section 3.2, our treatment estimates on NO2 and PM10 should
be interpreted as lower bound estimates of the true effect of the policy. One reason
for this is that we are differencing out effects of changes in travel habits if these spill
over to weekends, such as a shift from driving to cycling. Further, as we will show
in Section 4, the congestion charge led to an increased adoption of electric vehicles,
which may have lead to a higher share of electric vehicles on the road during both
weekdays and weekends.
In an attempt to incorporate these types of behavioral shifts in our treatment
estimate, we present findings from an alternative DiD strategy where we compare
air pollution levels across cities, pre and post the policy. A similar strategy has
been used in previous empirical papers examining effects of various transportation
policies on air pollution (see e.g., Simeonova et al., 2019; Zhai and Wolff, 2020). Note
however that exploiting differences across cities is only feasible for air pollution and
not traffic volume, as we only have access to traffic data from toll gates in Bergen. By
contrast, air pollution readings are available for several cities around the country.
By focusing on weekdays only and using differences across cities, we circumvent
potential problems of spillovers between weekdays and weekends. At the same time,
different cities may be subject to different local policies and time trends that might
confound the treatment effect, and that are hard to control for. The key identifying
assumption is that time-varying omitted variables relevant to air pollution affect all
cities similarly. Estimation results from the spatial DiD strategy are presented in
Appendix C.3 and show that the congestion charge lowered concentrations of NO2
by 4 µg/m3, or 8.4 percentage points, which is 1.9 percentage points larger than the
main results. Again, we find no significant effect on PM10.
4 Part II: Household-level behavior
In this part of the paper, we further examine effects of the congestion charge by
moving from station and sensor level data to rich registry data on household level
car ownership. The disaggregated data allows us to ask questions such as: How do
different types of households adapt to the congestion charge? To what extent do
households purchase an electric vehicle in response to the policy? Do households
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simply add a new car to their portfolio, or do they switch from ”brown” to ”green”?
By estimating a rich set of socioeconomic gradients, we also aim to unmask potential
behavioral differences in how households adapt to rising driving costs.33
4.1 Data sources
To construct a dataset on car ownership, household demographics, and congestion
charge exposure, we combine data from several sources, which are described below.34
4.1.1 Car ownership
We collect data on the full population of vehicles registered in Norway over the
period 2011-2017 from the National Motor Vehicle register. The register contains
technical vehicle information on each car, such as model and fuel type. From the
register, we also collect information on current and previous owners of each vehicle,
as well as the timing of several acquisition and disposal events, including the first
registration date, date of the previous ownership change, scrapping date and/or de-
registration dates. We restrict our dataset to privately owned passenger vehicles and
vans registered for non-commercial purposes, and stock-sample car owners from the
register at the end of each year (December 31st). Even though cars are registered
at the individual level, we consider car acquisitions a household level decision and
hence focus on households’ car ownership in the analysis. This leaves us with a panel
of car ownership at the household×year level, where each observation is a snapshot
of cars owned at the end of each year. See Appendix D for more information.
Figure 6 displays the annual share of households that owns an electric vehicle.
From December 2011 to December 2017, the share of Norwegian households that
owned an electric vehicle increased from around 0 % to around 4.5 % (dashed line).
The ownership share in 2017 was by far the highest in the world at the time.35
For Bergen municipality, the share of households that owned an electric vehicle by
the end of 2017 was around 8 % (solid line).36 In the empirical analysis, we aim
to disentangle effects of the Bergen congestion charge on electric vehicle ownership
33Ideally we would also like to examine the effect of the policy on household-level driving. How-
ever, data availability prevents us from investigating this margin of adjustment.
34See also Fevang et al. (2021) for a detailed description of the different data sources.
35According to IEA (2018), Norway had the world’s highest number of battery-electric vehicles
and plug-in hybrid as a share of the vehicle stock in 2017 (6.4 %). Only two other countries show
a stock share of 1 % or higher: Netherlands (1.6 %) and Sweden (1.0 %). Battery-electric vehicles
(BEVs) account for around two-thirds of the world’s electric car fleet.
36Note that the ownership share of electric vehicles is significantly higher in cities than in rural
areas, likely due to e.g., stronger local incentives, better accessibility of charging stations, and
shorter distances.
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Notes: Figure plots the share of households that own a battery electric vehicle on December 31 each year over
the period 2011-2017. The first observation reflects the electric vehicle share on December 31st 2011 and the last
observation reflects the electric vehicle share on December 31st 2017.
from other confounding trends, such as the increased supply of electric vehicles and
national EV policies.
4.1.2 Household characteristics
The car ownership data described above is linked to detailed socioeconomic data
on individuals and households from various Norwegian registers, such as the na-
tional population register and tax records. Specifically, we collect information on
age, gender, number of persons and children in the household, employment and re-
tirement status, income, wealth, education, and ownership of a second home (e.g.,
cabin). The registry data contains information about the location of each household
at the basic statistical unit level – the smallest geographical unit for which we have
micro-data. We refer to these units as “neighborhoods”. There are in total more
than 14,000 neighborhoods in Norway, with an average population of around 400
individuals, or less than 200 households.37 The detailed information on households
allows us to control for several characteristics in the empirical analysis that might
influence car ownership, as well as explore heterogeneous effects of the policy.
4.1.3 Journey to work and associated toll payments
In addition to socioeconomic information on individuals and households, all em-
ployed individuals are matched to their employer, allowing us to identify the place
37By comparison, there were 426 municipalities and 4,856 zip codes in Norway in 2017.
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of work at the neighborhood level. By combining the matched employer-employee
data with information on the road network, we calculate the fastest route between
centroids of the residential and workplace neighborhoods.38 We also collect data
on toll rates and coordinates of all toll gates in Norway from the Norwegian Public
Roads Administration.39 Toll gates are then mapped to each road link, allowing us
to calculate toll payments associated with the fastest route between all possible com-
binations of neighborhood pairs. The calculated toll payments provide a measure
of individual-level work trip exposure to the congestion charge. Lastly, we calculate
other work trip related variables such as driving time, distance to and from work,
and door-to-door time when using public transit.40
4.2 Empirical strategy
To identify causal effects of the congestion charge on household-level car ownership,
we aim to exploit quasi-random variation in individuals’ exposure to higher toll rates
on the road section between home and work.41 We start by defining two groups
of households which we refer to as paying commuters and non-paying commuters.
Paying commuters are households where at least one individual passes the toll cordon
on the (time-minimizing) route between home and work. Non-paying commuters
are households where none of the working individuals have toll payments associated
with the (time-minimizing) route between home and work. After the introduction
of the congestion charge in February 2016, the first group of households (paying
commuters) faced an increased cost of driving to work during rush hours. We view
this increased cost as a proxy for policy exposure.
Based on these two groups of households, a potential identification strategy
could be to compare the two groups before and after the policy in a Difference-in-
Differences (DiD) framework. Any time-invariant difference between the two groups
38To derive the fastest route, we use a publicly available dataset on the Nor-
wegian road network (https://register.geonorge.no/geodatalov-statusregister/elveg/
ed1e6798-b3cf-48be-aee1-c0d3531da01a) and find the route along the network that minimizes
the sum of link-specific travel time according to the speed limit.
39See Appendix Figure D.2 for toll road developments in Bergen and Stavanger over time.
40“Public transit time” is obtained from the Norwegian regional transportation models (RTM).
These are national transportation models frequently used by policy makers. The variable we use is
the sum of time on board, waiting time (calculated as a function of the frequency), transit time and
access/egress time (i.e. walking to/from the stations). Note that these numbers are not necessarily
based on the shortest public transit route; they are the output of a transportation model where
route choice is partly based on minimization of generalized travel costs, and partly calibrated to
fit observed data. The data on public transit time is static. For a more detailed description of how
public transit routes are coded in the transportation models, see Kwong and Ævarsson (2018).
41While individuals may be exposed to congestion charging on non-work trips as well, we assume
that rising driving costs on the road section between home and work will play an important role
in households’ response to the policy.
22
would then be differenced out. We argue, however, that the two types of households
faced different trends that would violate the parallel trends assumption and hence
bias the estimates. As described in Section 2, electric vehicles were exempted from
toll payments also before the introduction of the congestion charge. These incentives
for buying electric vehicles likely interacted with the increased availability and im-
proved quality of electric vehicles over time. As a consequence, “paying commuters”
faced a stronger incentive to buy an electric vehicle which has increased over our
sample period. This implies that we would expect to see a larger increase in electric
vehicle ownership for “paying commuters” compared to “non-paying commuters”
also in absence of the congestion charge.
To overcome the potential problem of non-parallel trends, we employ a triple
differences (DiDiD) framework, where we compare the difference between paying
and non-paying commuters in Bergen to a similar difference between households
located in a city without congestion charging.42 As several cities in Norway have
a toll cordon, we can define neighborhood pairs that are located on opposite sides
of the tolled area. We identify Stavanger as a similar sized city that has a toll
cordon, but where congestion charging was not introduced until October 2018. The
rates were similar to Bergen in the pre-period, and remained unchanged in the time
period analyzed.43 Our triple differences strategy hence aims to exploit variation
along three dimensions: (i) pre vs. post, (ii) paying commuters vs. non-paying
commuters, and (iii) Bergen vs. Stavanger.44
4.2.1 Estimating equation
More formally, our DiDiD estimator is written as:
yit = βpostt × ci ×Bi + αtci + ηci ×Bi +X ′itγ + θnt + εit, (2)
where i indicates household, t indicates year, yit is a placeholder for a relevant
household level outcome (e.g., electric vehicle ownership) in a given year, postt is
42Appendix D.2 shows the result of running two separate DiD regressions for these two cities.
As expected, paying commuters in both cities experienced an increase in electric vehicle ownership
relative to non-paying commuters (Appendix Figure D.4). Note that the vertical difference between
the estimated coefficients in the two DiD models is approximately the same as the triple difference
coefficients presented in Figure 7 and Table 5 in our main analysis.
43Bergen is the second largest city in Norway (with 255,464 inhabitants in 2017), while Stavanger
is the third largest city (with 222,697 inhabitants in 2017). Both cities are located in the south-
west of Norway, along the coast. See Appendix Table A.1 for an overview of cities with congestion
charging, and Appendix Figure D.2 for an overview of toll rates in Bergen and Stavanger in the
time period analyzed.
44See Appendix D.1 for details on sample restrictions and definitions of treatment and control
groups.
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a dummy variable equal to 1 after policy implementation, ci is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the household is classified as a “paying commuter”, and Bi is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the household is located in or close to Bergen (as opposed to
Stavanger). The coefficient of interest is β and reflects the triple differences estimate
(DiDiD). θnt indicates neighborhood×year fixed effects, and will absorb any time-
variant variation within narrowly defined areas in Bergen and Stavanger that are
common to paying commuters and non-paying commuters. This includes the effect
of other local electric vehicle incentives that potentially vary over time, such as
availability of charging stations and parking spaces. The αt parameters will absorb
the year specific effects of being a commuter, and η will absorb the effect of a being
paying commuters in Bergen pre policy implementation. εit is the idiosyncratic
error term and X ′it is a vector of demographics and work route specific controls; see
Appendix D.1 for details.
4.2.2 Identifying assumptions
A key identifying assumption underlying our empirical strategy is that paying com-
muters in Bergen and Stavanger would have experienced parallel trends in the out-
come variable in absence of the congestion charge - conditional on control vari-
ables and fixed effects. While this assumption is inherently untestable, parallel
pre-treatment trends suggest that the assumption is more likely to hold. To ex-
amine the validity of the parallel trends assumption, we estimate a version of our
DiDiD estimator where treatment effects are allowed to vary over time. By defining
the year prior to the announcement of the policy as the reference year (2014), the





αtci + βtci ×Bi
]




+X ′itγ + θnt + εit, (3)
where annual treatment effects are captured by βt. Parallel trends imply that βt ≈ 0
for the years prior to 2014. Note that η will absorb the 2014 level difference between
paying commuters in Bergen and Stavanger. Hence the annual treatment effects βt
are identified from the annual deviations from 2014 levels.
4.2.3 Interpretation of the DiDiD estimate
As our empirical strategy relies on exposure to the policy on the road section be-
tween home and work, our estimated treatment effect should be interpreted as a
local treatment effect for the sub-population of households where at least one in-
dividual is employed. For households where none of the individuals are employed
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(e.g., students, retirees, unemployed), effects of the congestion charge may be very
different. Further, we use work-trip exposure to the congestion charge as a proxy for
policy exposure, while the congestion charge may affect non-work trips as well. Our
empirical strategy could hence be interpreted as a form of treatment intensity, were
we assume that households that face a congestion charge on their way to work will
be more intensively exposed than those that do not. This means that households
in the control group (non-paying commuters) will potentially also be exposed to
higher driving costs, but presumably to a lesser extent than the treatment group.
As a result, our estimated treatment effect should be interpreted as a lower bound
of the causal effect of the policy for the particular sub-population defined.
4.2.4 Heterogeneous effects
To examine how different types of households respond to the congestion charge,
we estimate a version of the DiDiD estimator where we allow treatment effects to
vary by different socioeconomic groups. When k ∈ K denotes group (e.g., income





βkpostt ×Bi × ci + αtkci + δtk + ηkBi × ci + ψkBi
]
1{i ∈ k}
+X ′itγ + θnt + εit, (4)
where the treatment effect for group k is captured by βk. Note that all coefficients ex-
cept demographics and neighborhood×year fixed effects are k specific. This ensures
a flexible model were we account for several group-specific time-varying factors.45
4.3 Descriptives based on the estimation sample
Based on our empirical strategy, we restrict our data set to households located
in or close to Bergen and Stavanger, and where at least one household member
is employed. See Appendix D.1 for more details on the sample restriction. The
trimmed sample leaves us with 76,088 households observed over a period of 7 years,
resulting in an unbalanced panel of 448,196 household×year observations.
Table 4 shows summary statistics for 2014 by city and commuter group based
on the estimation sample.46 The electric vehicle share among paying commuters is
similar across the two cities in 2014 (5 % in Bergen and 4 % in Stavanger). We also
45A fully flexible model where all variables are k specific would be equivalent to estimating
separate regressions of Equation 2 for each group k.
46See Appendix Table D.4 for the same summary statistics in 2017.
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Table 4: Summary statistics, by city and commuter group. 2014
Bergen Stavanger
Paying Non-paying Paying Non-paying
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Panel A: Outcomes
Electric vehicle (0/1) 0.047 0.211 0.028 0.164 0.036 0.185 0.020 0.138
Number of electric vehicles 0.048 0.220 0.028 0.171 0.037 0.195 0.020 0.141
Number of ICE vehicles 1.173 0.838 1.447 0.872 1.483 0.830 1.357 0.849
Total number of vehicles 1.221 0.856 1.476 0.877 1.520 0.836 1.377 0.854
Panel B: Journey to work variables
Toll rate (NOK/individual) 23.51 7.43 0.00 0.00 17.69 6.23 0.00 0.00
Toll rate (NOK/household) 34.80 17.43 0.00 0.00 26.53 13.13 0.00 0.00
Driving distance (km) 12.37 8.10 14.07 8.83 13.63 6.68 10.45 5.85
Driving time (min) 13.25 8.57 14.93 9.60 13.80 6.81 11.70 7.35
PT time minus driving time (min) 56.65 43.77 90.33 79.61 76.70 53.50 76.05 77.45
PT time divided by driving time 5.37 2.71 7.48 5.36 6.98 4.61 8.04 8.15
Panel C: Socio-economic variables
Couple (0/1) 0.71 0.45 0.69 0.46 0.76 0.43 0.67 0.47
Children living at home (0/1) 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.41 0.49
Persons in household 2.62 1.34 2.66 1.38 2.84 1.38 2.63 1.41
Age 44.37 12.09 45.01 12.43 44.01 11.44 44.48 12.28
Female (0/1) 0.49 0.28 0.49 0.29 0.48 0.25 0.48 0.29
Owns second home 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31
Employed (0/1) 0.94 0.17 0.90 0.20 0.94 0.16 0.92 0.19
Retired (0/1) 0.06 0.20 0.07 0.22 0.05 0.18 0.06 0.20
Income (100,000 NOK/individual) 4.17 3.14 3.90 2.36 4.70 2.87 4.45 2.97
Income (100,000 NOK/household) 7.17 4.73 6.60 4.60 8.31 5.64 7.47 5.79
Wealth (mill NOK/individual) 1.64 6.16 1.32 3.43 1.72 3.02 1.84 5.21
Wealth (mill NOK/household) 2.81 8.74 2.26 6.17 3.08 5.55 3.14 10.06
Education:
Unknown (0/1) 0.17 0.37 0.17 0.38 0.14 0.34 0.19 0.39
Less than high school (0/1) 0.07 0.26 0.12 0.33 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.32
High school (0/1) 0.22 0.42 0.35 0.48 0.30 0.46 0.29 0.45
College (0/1) 0.31 0.46 0.26 0.44 0.29 0.45 0.26 0.44
University (0/1) 0.23 0.42 0.08 0.28 0.17 0.38 0.15 0.35
Observations 12244 21742 23747 18355
Notes: Table shows summary statistics for 2014 based on the estimation sample. Paying refers to paying commuters.
Non-paying refers to non-paying commuters. ICE refers to “internal combustion engine”, and PT refers to “public
transit”. All variables except “children” and “number of household members” are individual specific, but averaged
across spouses. In the empirical estimation, we control for the following set of variables: female, employed, retired,
second home, children, education level, the number of persons registered at the household, two polynomials in age,
income, wealth, distance and driving time to work, two polynomials in the absolute and relative time differences to
get to work by public transit versus private car. If a variable is missing for one of the spouses, the other spouse’s
value is used as a proxy for the household average. We let the coefficients for all variables be couple and single
specific (i.e., whether the household has one or two adult members). More detailed variable descriptions can be
found in Appendix Table D.3. Descriptives for 2017 can be found in Appendix Table D.4.
see that the electric vehicle share among non-paying commuters is lower for both
cities (3 % in Bergen and 2 % in Stavanger). In the DiDiD strategy, we will compare
the development in car ownership for the two types of household groups in Bergen,
to the equivalent difference in ownership share for the two types of households in
Stavanger.
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From Panel B in Table 4, we see that average toll rates associated with the
journey to work is NOK 0 for non-paying commuters (by construction), NOK 23.5
for paying commuters in Bergen and NOK 17.7 for paying commuters in Stavanger.
Appendix Figure D.2 shows the development in toll rates over time, and reveals that
paying commuters in Stavanger were subject to the same toll level in the period 2013
to 2017.47 Paying commuters in Bergen, however, experienced an increase in toll
rates over the same period. From Appendix Figure D.2, Panel A we see that there
was a small increase in toll rates in Bergen the year before the congestion charge
was introduced (2014), and then a larger jump in 2016 when rush hour pricing was
implemented.48 This means that estimated treatment effects will likely reflect a
response to both these jumps in toll rates (i.e., the effect of changing the toll rate
from NOK 13 all day to NOK 45 (19) during (non-) rush hours). If we observe
a positive treatment effect in 2015 on car ownership, this might reflect effects of
both the congestion charge announcement on February 1 2015 as well as a potential
delayed response to the jump in toll rates in 2014.
Panel C shows summary statistics for various socioeconomic variables. Overall,
paying commuters in Bergen and Stavanger are relativity similar across most demo-
graphics – although paying commuters in Stavanger are more likely to be two-adult
households and have slightly higher income and education levels. If we compare pay-
ing computers to non-paying commuters, the former are more likely to be couples
and tend to be richer and with a higher education level.
4.4 Results on car ownership
Figure 7 displays annual treatment effects estimated from the DiDiD specification in
Equation 3. From panel (a), we see that households exposed to the Bergen conges-
tion charge were more than 4 percentage points more likely to own an electric vehicle
by the end of 2017. The treatment effects in 2016 and 2017 are roughly of the same
magnitude and both effects are clearly significantly different from zero. We also find
a positive and significant treatment effect on electric vehicle ownership in the end
of 2015, suggesting that households responded to the announcement of the policy in
47Panel A of Appendix Figure D.2 shows how toll rates in Bergen and Stavanger has changed
over time, while Panel B of Appendix Figure D.2 shows the average toll exposure per year for
paying and non-paying commuter households in Bergen and Stavanger. Note that the average
household level toll exposure in Appendix Figure D.2, Panel B is slightly lower than the actual toll
rates as several households only have one spouse that is exposed to toll charges on his/her way to
work, while the other spouse live and work on the same side of the toll cordon.
48The congestion charge was implemented early in the year (marked by the vertical line), but
as our data is at the annual level the jump in toll rates does not show up until the observation at
Dec 31st, 2016.
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the beginning of the year (in February 2015). The presence of an anticipation effect
is unsurprising as cars are durable goods and car acquisition decisions are typically
made with future expectations taken into account. Furthermore, the electric vehi-
cle market in the period around policy announcement was characterized by excess
demand and long waiting lists, meaning that households would have difficulties in
timing the car acquisition to a specific date. Looking at the pre-intervention period
(2011-2014), estimated coefficients are close to zero, supporting the validity of the
parallel trends assumption. While we do find a statistically significant effect in one
of the pre-treatment years, this deviation appears small compared to the large jump
in the electric vehicle share in the post-treatment period.
Panel (b) in Figure 7 shows treatment effects on the number of internal combus-
tion engine (ICE) vehicles owned by a household. The negative treatment effects
on ICE vehicles are close to a mirror image of the positive effects on electric vehicle
adoption, suggesting that households switched from “green” to “brown” rather than
adding an additional vehicle to their household. This is also confirmed by the non-
significant treatment effects on the total number of vehicles owned by a household;
see Figure 7, panel (c).
Table 5: DiDiD estimates on vehicle ownership
Probability Number of vehicles
Dependent variable: Pr(BEV) BEV ICEV Total
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post × Paying commuters × Bergen 0.0419∗∗∗ 0.0451∗∗∗ -0.0422∗∗∗ 0.00288
(0.00593) (0.00652) (0.0119) (0.0116)
Observations 376914 376914 376914 376914
Mean depvar 2014 (paying commuters, Bergen) 0.0469 0.0482 1.1730 1.2212
Mean depvar 2017 (paying commuters, Bergen) 0.1774 0.1872 1.1555 1.3427
Paying commuter × year FE (αtci) X X X X
Paying commuter × Bergen FE (ηci ×Bi) X X X X
Household characteristics (X ′itγ) X X X X
Neighborhood × year FE (θnt) X X X X
Notes: Table plots the coefficient β estimated from Equation 2. The dependent variable is indicated by the column
heading. BEV refers to battery electric vehicles, ICEV refers to internal combustion engine vehicles, and Total
refers to the total number of vehicles owned by the household. The sample is restricted to the years 2011-2017,
where 2016-2017 denotes the “post” period and 2015 is excluded due to potential anticipation effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 5 shows average treatment effects for the car ownership variables when
we restrict the post period to 2016-2017 and the pre period to 2011-2014. The
estimate in column (1) suggests that the congestion charge on average induced a
4.2 percentage point increase in the probability of owning an electric vehicle in
the post implementation years. To illustrate the magnitude of this effect, we find
28
Figure 7: DiDiD estimates on vehicle ownership
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Notes: Figure plots coefficients βt estimated from equation 3, where β2014 is normalized to zero. Panel (a) shows
the annual treatment effect on the probability of a household owning a battery electric vehicle. Panel (b) shows the
annual treatment effect on the number of internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles owned by a household. Panel
(c) shows the annual treatment effect on the total number of vehicles owned by a household. Standard errors are
clustered at the neighborhood level. All regressions include the following set of controls: female, employed, retired,
second home, children, education level, number of persons registered at the household, two polynomials in age,
income, wealth, distance and driving time to work, two polynomials in the absolute and relative time differences
to get to work by public transit versus private car. All controls are single/couple specific.
that the congestion charge can explain around 1/3 of the increase in electric vehicle
ownership for the treatment group from 2014 to 2017.49 See also Figure 8 for an
illustration of the treatment effect. At the same time, we find that the policy reduced
the average number of ICE vehicles owned by a household by 0.042 (see column 3),
49This can be derived from the observed electric vehicle shares in 2014 and 2017 reported in
column (1) of Table 5.
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resulting in a zero effect on the total number of vehicles owned by a household (see
column 4). Our findings hence suggest that the congestion charge helped induce a
substantial increase in the number of electric vehicles, while at the same time leaving
the average number of cars owned unchanged.
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BEV share, paying commuters in Bergen
Predicted BEV share in absence of the policy
Notes: Solid line shows the share households among paying commuters in Bergen that owned an electric vehicle
in the period 2011-2017. Dashed line shows the predicted share of households among paying commuters in Bergen
that would have owned an electric vehicle in absence of the congestion charge, based on the treatment estimates
reported in Figure 7a. The vertical distance between the two lines indicate the annual treatment effects. The
vertical dotted line denotes the announcement date (Feb 18th 2015) and the vertical dashed line denotes the
implementation date (Feb 1st 2016).
Next, we examine the sensitivity of our main results to various specifications of
fixed effects and demographic controls. In particular, we show that the inclusion of
neighborhood×year fixed effects are important for the magnitude of our estimates
(Appendix Table D.5). This comes as no surprise as the demand for electric vehicles
is increasing over time and likely to be affected by several local aspects of the
residential neighborhood, such as access to parking and charging stations. Moreover,
accessibility, travel demand and exposure to toll charges and other local electric
vehicle incentives that are unrelated to the commute are likely to be captured by
these fixed effects. Appendix Figure D.6 shows that our main result on electric
vehicle adoption is robust to the inclusion of demographics and journey to work
controls. The stability of our treatment estimate across nine different specifications
suggest that our neighborhood-year fixed effects do a good job in controlling for
various socioeconomic characteristics. For ICE vehicles, the estimated treatment
effect is larger (i.e., more negative) for the specification without any demographic
controls. However, including journey to work controls seem to be sufficient to arrive
at a robust treatment effect; adding seven additional sets of demographic controls
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has little effect on the estimated treatment effect.
4.4.1 Heterogeneous effects
The estimated average treatment effects presented in the previous section are likely
to mask substantial heterogeneity. In the following, we examine heterogeneous treat-
ment effects along six socioeconomic dimensions: income, family size, education,
age, commuting distance, and public transit quality. Key results are presented in
Figure 9, while supporting results are available in Appendix D.3.
Income: Allowing the treatment effect to vary by household income, we find a
clear income gradient in electric vehicle adoption; see panel (a) in Figure 9. While
households in the highest quintile are 7 percentage points more likely to adopt an
electric vehicle in response to the policy, the corresponding number for the lowest
income quintile is close to zero and non-significant.50 This observed heterogeneous
pattern could be due to both preferences and financial constraints. First, high-
income households might prefer to purchase an electric vehicle in response to the
policy, while low-income households prefer to change their mode of transportation
to e.g., public transit or cycling. Differences in the margin of adjustment could
reflect different preferences for adopting new technology, differences in the value of
time, or differences in utility from cycling or using public transit. At the same time,
the heterogeneous pattern may also reflect financial barriers; purchasing an electric
vehicle in the time period we are considering is synonymous with purchasing a new
car (due to the negligible market for used electric vehicles). Low-income households
may therefore in practice have a more limited opportunity set than high-income
households, as the only used cars available are internal combustion engine vehicles.51
Even if a low-income household considers it cheaper in the long-run to purchase an
electric vehicle rather than paying road toll, financial constraints may prevent the
household from pursing its optimal adaptation behavior.52
50See Appendix Table D.6 for coefficients in table format. In Appendix Figure D.8 we also show
that high-income households are less likely of adopting an internal combustion engine vehicle,
which suggest that the switch from brown to green is driven by the same type of households. This
interpretation is also confirmed by looking at Appendix Figure D.9, which shows a close to zero
effect on total car ownership for all income quintiles.
51Note that purchasing a new electric vehicle in Norway is not necessarily more expensive than
purchasing a new conventional vehicle. As electric vehicles are exempted from both the value added
tax and the registration tax, electric vehicles actually tend to be cheaper than comparable conven-
tional cars; see Appendix Table E.2 for an illustration. Purchasing new cars in general, however,
occurs eight times more frequently within the top income decile compared to the bottom one; this
holds for both battery-electric and conventional vehicles (see Fevang et al., 2021, Figure 5c).
52In a simplified calculation presented in Appendix Table E.3, we show that purchasing a new
electric vehicle might in fact be a cheaper option than purchasing a used internal combustion engine
vehicle when taking into account both congestion charges and fuel costs.
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Quintiles of public transit quality
Notes: Figure plots the coefficients βk estimated from equation 4, where k refers to group (e.g., income quintile).
Each panel (a-f) plots coefficients estimates from a separate regression. Whiskers indicate 95 % confidence intervals.
The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household owns an electric vehicle in year t and
0 otherwise. Groups are based on 2014 demographics. “Income” is summed over spouses, “education” is the
maximum value in each household and “age”, “work distance” and “public transit quality” are averaged over
spouses. Public transit quality is defined as “time to work by public transit minus time to work by car” in minutes.
The sample is restricted to the years 2011-2017, where 2016-2017 denotes the “post” period and 2015 is excluded
due to potential anticipation effects. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. See Appendix
Table D.6 for coefficients in table format.
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Household type, education, and age: In a next step, we examine how treatment
effects vary by household type, education, and age. We find that the probability
of adopting an electric vehicle in response to the policy is significantly higher for
couples with children below 18 years; see Figure 9, panel (b). For single adult
households, the treatment effect is close to zero - irrespective of children in the
household. The heterogeneous pattern may reflect that couples with kids are less
flexible in changing their mode of transportation. A larger family involves more
logistics, which might make it harder to switch to e.g., public transit. There may
also be economies of scale that makes it more cost efficient for these households to
invest in an electric vehicle. Further, we find that the treatment effect is increasing
in educational attainment, with the largest effect for college and university educated
households (panel c). This pattern could potentially reflect a correlation between
educational attainment and preferences for new technologies. It might also indicate
a higher awareness of environmental and climate benefits of driving an EV among
higher educated households. Previous literature also suggest that individuals tend
to “undervalue” future fuel savings when purchasing a vehicle (see e.g., Allcott and
Wozny, 2014), and this tendency might weaken with education. Lastly, we document
an inverse u-shaped relationship between electric vehicle adoption and age (panel
d), with households close to retirement age as the least responsive group.
As education and age covary with income, the observed heterogeneous patterns
are likely to reflect a combined effect of income and the demographic in question -
in addition to other correlated variables. In an attempt to disentangle the income
channel from other mechanisms, we estimate heterogeneous effects separately for the
lowest and highest income quintile; see Appendix Figure D.7. Findings show that
households in the lowest income quintile are non-responsive to the policy irrespective
of educational attainment and age. This suggests that financial barriers may play
an important role in EV adoption. For high-income households, who are more
likely to afford a new electric vehicle, treatment effects are increasing in educational
attainment and decreasing in age. These patterns suggest that age and education
have an effect on EV adoption that go beyond the income effect.
Commuting distance and public transit quality: A household’s adaptation
decision may also depend on the quality of transportation substitutes. From Fig-
ure 9, we see that the probability of EV adoption is increasing in the driving distance
to work (panel e) and decreasing in public transit quality (panel f). Public transit
quality is proxied by the additional time it takes to get to work by public transit com-
pared to driving a private car.53 While these findings suggest that transportation
53Time by public transit includes average waiting time and walking time to and from stations.
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substitutes influence a household’s adaptation response, the distributional implica-
tions are not clear cut. On the one hand, the driving distance to work and the
quality of public transit may reflect a sorting process where individuals choose their
preferred neighborhood based on amenities - including public transit access. To the
extent that this process is voluntary (i.e., not constrained by financial barriers), and
public transit quality is capitalized into housing prices and rents, the distributional
impacts of the policy may be less of a concern. On the other hand, the heterogeneous
pattern may reflect a “lock-in” effect for households living in rural areas with poor
public transit options. As switching to cycling or public transit is less feasible, these
households are likely to face a higher adaptation cost as they are disproportionately
“forced” to use the electric vehicle channel to avoid congestion charges.
Again, commuting distance and public transit quality may covary with income.
In Appendix Figure D.7, we show that households in the lowest income quintile are
non-responsive to public transit quality and work distance. By contrast, high-income
households with poor public transit quality are more likely to purchase an electric
vehicle compared to similarly wealthy households with better public transit options.
A similar pattern emerges for work distance. While suggestive, these findings add
to the evidence base suggesting that low-income households are to a larger extent
locked into existing behavioral patterns.
5 Discussion
This section provides some simple back-of-the-envelope welfare calculations, as well
as a short discussion of the distributional implications of the congestion charge.
5.1 Welfare effects
To give a rough estimate of the net welfare effect of the policy, we combine the
treatment effects presented in previous sections with a set of assumptions and cost
estimates. In our calculations, we consider three categories of social benefits (im-
proved air quality, lower CO2 emissions, time savings due to less congestion) and
contrast these to the private adaptation costs. Focusing on marginal changes in




Local pollutants︷ ︸︸ ︷
∆NO2 ·MCNO2 + ∆PM10 ·MCPM10 +
Global pollutant︷ ︸︸ ︷
∆CO2 ·MCCO2 +
Time savings︷ ︸︸ ︷
∆Time · VoT︸ ︷︷ ︸
Social Benefits




where MC indicates marginal cost, Time indicates driving time, and V oT indicates
the value of travel time. Below we give a short description of the welfare calculations,
while more details are provided in Appendices E.1–E.5.
Adaptation costs: A congestion charge imposes private costs because the policy
prevents drivers from choosing their preferred travel mode, route, or time. We
consider four ways in which individuals may adapt to the congestion charge: (1)
not drive at all (e.g., change mode of transportation, or work from home), (2) shift
driving to non-rush hours (intertemporal substitution), (3) drive around the toll
cordon (spatial substitution), and (4) buy an electric vehicle to avoid charges. Note
that the actual toll payments made by drivers is simply a transfer from households to
the government; if we disregard transaction costs, these payments have no associated
social costs.54 To quantify the adaptation costs related to (1)-(3), we combine the
estimated reduction in cars passing the toll cordon during rush hours (Table 2) with
derived adaptation costs per trip using the triangle area formula. To quantify the
private costs of substituting towards electric vehicles (4), we combine estimates from
our household-level ownership regressions (Table 5) with various assumptions.
Local and global pollutants: To quantify social benefits of reduced air pollution,
we combine our estimates on changes in ambient levels of NO2 and PM10 (Table 3)
with estimates on the social cost of exposure to air pollution, which we compile
from the literature. To quantify benefits of lower CO2 emissions, we consider the ef-
fects of reduced driving – taking into account intertemporal and spatial substitution
(Table 2, Table B.5) – as well as the substitution towards electric vehicles (Table 5).
Time savings: A key benefit of congestion charging is time savings due to less
congestion. Unfortunately our data lacks a relevant congestion measure such as
driving speed or time spent in traffic. As a second best solution, we combine our
detailed traffic data with before-after estimates of average time savings on different
routes collected from a descriptive report (NPRA, 2016).
54The flat rate, however, implies taking a larger percentage of income from low-income earners,
which has distributional implications; see Section 5.2.
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Net welfare effect: Table 6 gives an overview of the calculated social benefits
and costs of the policy. Overall, we find that the Bergen congestion charge led to
a positive and economically significant net welfare gain of around NOK 49 million
per year, equivalent to around USD 5.92 million per year. The welfare calculations
imply a benefit to cost ratio of 3.2. Our conclusion of a net welfare gain is robust to
excluding any one of the four social benefit components, or assuming that adaptation
costs are twice as high as our preferred estimate.
Table 6: Welfare effects of the congestion charge
mill. NOK/year
Total social benefits 71.57
Lower NO2 concentrations 9.05
Lower PM10 concentrations 16.14
Lower CO2 emissions 4.12
Less congestion (saved travel time) 42.26
Total adaptation costs 22.22
Changing mode, route, or time 18,51
Changing vehicle type (to electric) 3.72
Net welfare effects (NOK) 49.34
Net welfare effects (USD) 5.92
5.2 Distributional concerns
While we find a net welfare gain of the policy, benefits and costs are not necessarily
evenly distributed across different population groups. In Section 4.4.1, we show that
there are systematic differences in how households adapt to the policy. In particular,
we find that high income households are more likely to adopt an electric vehicle in
response to the policy. We further find that a long work commute and poor access
to public transit increase the chances of adopting an electric vehicle - but only for
high-income households. The latter suggests that low-income households may to a
larger extent be locked into existing behavioral patterns.
Another dimension affecting the distributional profile of the policy is the actual
toll payments. As congestion charges are imposed as a flat rate, they make up a
larger percentage of the budget for low-income earners, meaning that the charges
are regressive. Based on some simple calculations presented in Appendix Table E.3,
the sum of congestion charges payed on the work commute over a year are likely to
be in the same order of magnitude as the annual fuel costs. The congestion charges
hence make up a non-negligible share of the car ownership costs.
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There are, however, several aspects that dampen the regressivity of the conges-
tion charge. First, the regressive profile only applies to the part of the population
that actually owns a car. In 2016, the car ownership rate in Norway was around
30 %, and those that do not own a car are on average 30 % poorer and have less
education (see Fevang et al., 2021, Table 1 for a detailed overview). This means
that the congestion charge will be less regressive when looking at the full popula-
tion and not only car owners. Second, congestion charges are usually implemented
around cities, where income levels tend to be higher. Moreover, households exposed
to congestion charges on their work commute are on average slightly richer and
more educated than non-exposed households, as illustrated in Table 4. The fact
that policy exposure is positively correlated with income dampens the regressivity
of the policy. Lastly, the net distributional effects of congestion charges will depend
on how the proceeds from the policy are used. Around 70 % of the revenues from
congestion charges in Bergen is budgeted for public transit purposes,55 which tends
to disproportionally benefit lower-income groups. Accounting for all the elements
mentioned above will tend to dampen the regressivity of the policy.
6 Conclusion
Combating climate change and poor urban air quality will require a fundamental
shift towards greener modes of transportation. Policies that incentivize individuals
to choose low-emission transportation alternatives will likely play a key role in this
transition. To ensure that market-based policies work as intended and retain public
support, there is a need to better understand behavioral responses to these types of
policies, and effects on emissions.
This paper shows that differentiating driving costs by time of day and vehicle
type can help reduce traffic, improve urban air quality, and shift the composition
of the car fleet towards electric vehicles. Exploiting a congestion charge in Norway
that imposed spatial and temporal variation in the costs of driving a high-emission
vehicle, we find that the policy reduced rush hour traffic by 14.5 % and daily traf-
fic by around 4.8 %. The lower traffic translated into cleaner air: we estimate a
6.7 µg/m3 reduction in ambient levels of NO2 during midday hours, equivalent to
an 11 % decrease. Examining adaptation responses, we find that the congestion
charge increased the probability of a household owning an electric vehicle by around
4.2 percentage points – explaining around 1/3 of the observed increase in electric
55This percentage applies to the budget period 2018-2037; see: https://www.regjeringen.
no/contentassets/66644bf4b3e642acaf10bea324af42b8/byvekstavtale-bergen-2017-2023.
pdf, pg. 26 (accessed August, 2020).
37
vehicle ownership over the same period. The increase in electric vehicle ownership
was mirrored by a similar decrease in the ownership of fossil fuel vehicles, leaving
the total number of cars unchanged. We document strong heterogeneous patterns
along several socioeconomic dimensions, with high-income households responding
more strongly to the electric vehicle incentives. Overall, we find that the congestion
charge led to a net welfare gain, with a cost ratio of 3.2.
The magnitude of our findings should be interpreted in light of Norway’s ex-
ceptionally high electric vehicle share and well-developed charging infrastructure.
Estimated effects, however, may be informative of expected impacts of raising driv-
ing costs for fossil fuel cars in other countries at a future point in time when electric
vehicles are more competitive (e.g., due to technological improvements). Further,
while we highlight strong socioeconomic gradients in the adoption of electric vehi-
cles, our findings may reflect both different preferences as well as barriers that limit
the opportunity set of households. We leave it up to future research to further dis-
entangle these two mechanisms, and to shed additional light on distributional effects
of transportation policies aimed at mitigating local and global externalities.
References
Allcott, H. and Wozny, N. (2014). Gasoline prices, fuel economy, and the energy
paradox. Review of Economics and Statistics, 96(5):779–795.
Archsmith, J., Heyes, A., and Saberian, S. (2018). Air quality and error quantity:
Pollution and performance in a high-skilled, quality-focused occupation.
Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists,
5(4):827–863.
Auffhammer, M. and Kellogg, R. (2011). Clearing the air? the effects of gasoline
content regulation on air quality. American Economic Review,
101(6):2687–2722.
Avol, E. L., Gauderman, W. J., Tan, S. M., London, S. J., and Peters, J. M.
(2001). Respiratory effects of relocating to areas of differing air pollution
levels. American journal of respiratory and critical care medicine,
164(11):2067–2072.
Bento, A., Kaffine, D., Roth, K., and Zaragoza-Watkins, M. (2014). The effects of
regulation in the presence of multiple unpriced externalities: Evidence from
the transportation sector. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
6(3):1–29.
38
Bondy, M., Roth, S., and Sager, L. (2020). Crime is in the air: The
contemporaneous relationship between air pollution and crime. Journal of the
Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 7(3):555–585.
Breivik, A.-L., Holmas, T. H., and Riise, J. (2020). Effects of air pollution on
health and productivity. Unpublished.
Chang, T., Graff Zivin, J., Gross, T., and Neidell, M. (2016). Particulate pollution
and the productivity of pear packers. American Economic Journal: Economic
Policy, 8(3):141–69.
Clinton, B. C. and Steinberg, D. C. (2019). Providing the spark: Impact of
financial incentives on battery electric vehicle adoption. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 98:102255.
Currie, J. and Walker, R. (2011). Traffic congestion and infant health: Evidence
from e-zpass. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3(1):65–90.
Davis, L. W. (2008). The effect of driving restrictions on air quality in mexico city.
Journal of Political Economy, 116(1):38–81.
Ebenstein, A., Lavy, V., and Roth, S. (2016). The long-run economic consequences
of high-stakes examinations: Evidence from transitory variation in pollution.
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 8(4):36–65.




Fevang, E., Figenbaum, E., Fridstrøm, L., Halse, A. H., Hauge, K. E., Johansen,
B. G., and Raaum, O. (2021). Who goes electric? The anatomy of electric car
ownership in Norway. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and
Environment, 92:102727.
Figenbaum, E., Assum, T., and Kolbenstvedt, M. (2015). Electromobility in
norway: experiences and opportunities. Research in Transportation
Economics, 50:29–38.
Figenbaum, E. and Kolbenstvedt, M. (2016). Learning from norwegian battery
electric and plug-in hybrid vehicle users. results from a survey of vehicle
owners. TØI report 1492/2016.
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Table A.1: Congestion pricing in Norway. 2013-2019
Kristiansand Trondheim Bergen Oslo Stavanger
Date implemented Nov 19, 2013 Mar 10, 2014 Feb 1, 2016 Nov 1, 2017 Oct 1, 2018
Morning rush 6:30-9:00 7:00-9:00 6:30-9:00 6:30-9:00 07:00-09:00
Afternoon rush 14:30-17:00 15:00-17:00 14:30-16:30 15:00-17:00 15:00-17:00
Price pre 21 0 25 35 20
Price post: rush hour 21 22 45 54/59* 44
Price post: non-rush 14 11 19 44/49** 22
Notes: Prices are given in NOK. 10 NOK ≈ 1 EUR and ≈ 1.2 USD. Prices reflect the rate for small passenger vehicles at the time
of implementation. *gasoline cars: NOK 54, diesel cars: NOK 59. ** gasoline cars: NOK 44, diesel cars: NOK 49




















2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Year
Notes: Figures shows toll rates for Bergen for the period 2005 to 2017. The congestion charge was introduced on
February 1 2016.
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Table A.2: Key air pollutants and the relative contribution of different sources.
Source NO2 PM10 PM2.5 SO2 CO O3
Exhaust VH M H S
Wear and tear from roads, tires, and breaks VH M
Sand added to increase friction of icy road surfaces VH M
Wood-fired ovens H H
Manufacturing industry M M M M
Ship traffic M S S M
Long-range pollution S M H S VH
Notes: VH refers to very high contribution, H refers to high contribution, M refers to medium contribution, S refers
to small contribution. The contribution of different sources are specific to Norway, and may differ from the most
important sources in other countries. Note that the levels of CO in Norway are generally too low to represent any
threat to human health. Source: NILU (2019).
Table A.3: The Norwegian EV incentives (as of January 2020)
Year Instrument Local in-
centive?
1990 Exempted from purchase/import taxes
1996 Exempted from annual road tax
1997 Exempted from road toll1 Yes
1997 Exempted from ferry charges2 Yes
1999 Free municipal parking3 Yes
2000 50 % reduced company car tax4
2001 Exempted from 25% VAT on purchase
2005 Access to bus lanes5 Yes
2015 Exempted from 25% VAT on leasing
2018 Fiscal compensation for scrapping fossil car when switching to a zero-emission car
2019 Holders of driver license class B allowed to drive electric car class C1 (light lorries)
Source: https://elbil.no/english/norwegian-ev-policy/. Year refers to the year implemented.
1 From 2019: local authorities allowed to impose a rate of maximum 50% of the toll road.
2 From 2018: local authorities allowed to impose a rate of maximum 50% of the ferry fares.
3 From 2018: parking fees for EVs introduced locally. Upper limit of 50% of full price.
4 From 2018: company car tax reduction reduced to 40%.
5 From 2016: local authorities allowed to limit access to bus lanes to EVs that carry one or more passengers.
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Appendix B Traffic
B.1 Data and descriptives
B.1.1 Raw means two years pre and post, by small and large vehicles
Figure B.1: Traffic volume by 15 min. intervals, 2 years pre and post Feb 1 2016.
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Notes: Figures show the average number of vehicles passing the toll cordon over the course of a day, based on
15 minute intervals. Panels (a) and (c) show averages for weekdays and panels (b) and (d) show averages for
the weekend. Dashed lines indicate averages for the 730 days prior to policy implementation. Solid lines indicate
averages for the 730 days post policy implementation. Gray shaded areas indicate rush hours. Passenger cars: all
vehicles < 3500 kg. Trucks: all vehicles > 3500 kg.
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B.1.2 Raw means one year pre and post
Figure B.2: Traffic volume by 15 min. intervals, 1 year pre and post Feb 1 2016.
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Notes: Figures show the average number of vehicles passing the toll cordon over the course of a day, based on
15 minute intervals. The left side panels show averages for weekdays and the right side panels show averages for
the weekend. Dashed lines indicate averages for the 365 days prior to policy implementation. Solid lines indicate
averages for the 365 days post policy implementation. Gray shaded areas indicate rush hours. Passenger cars: all
vehicles < 3500 kg. Trucks: all vehicles > 3500 kg.
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B.1.3 Placebo intervention: 1 year pre and post Feb 1st 2015
Figure B.3: Traffic volume by 15 min. intervals, 1 year pre and post Feb 1 2015
(”Placebo intervention”).
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Notes: Figures show the average number of vehicles passing the toll cordon over the course of a day, based on 15
minute intervals. The left side panels show averages for weekdays and the right side panels show averages for the
weekend. Dashed lines indicate averages for the 365 days prior to Feb 1 2015. Solid lines indicate averages for the
365 days post Feb 1 2015. Gray shaded areas indicate rush hours. Passenger cars: all vehicles < 3500 kg. Trucks:
all vehicles > 3500 kg.
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B.2 Supporting results and robustness checks
B.2.1 Results for small and large vehicles
Figure B.4 splits the effect between small and large vehicles. The effect for small ve-
hicles follows the trend in Figure 4 closely, while the effect for large vehicles is more
evenly spread throughout the day. There could be several reasons for this: Large
vehicles consist mainly of trucks, which may to a greater extent be bound by delivery
times and the truck drivers’ work schedules, making avoiding the congestion charge
difficult. The general decrease may stem from lower commercial activity in the
city center during weekdays due to the congestion charge, reducing the demand for
freight. Alternatively, the congestion charge could have incentivized shippers to op-
timize their consolidation routines, thereby reducing the number of trucks required.
However, we do not have appropriate data to examine these mechanisms further.
Figure B.5 displays similar results for a shorter time time frame of plus/minus one
year of the date of policy implementation.
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Notes: Figure plots treatment effects estimated from from equation 1, where regressions are run separately for
each 15 minute increment. Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. Gray shaded areas indicate rush hours.
Traffic is measured as total number of cars passing the toll cordon every 15 minutes. Standard errors are clustered
on week. Passenger cars: all vehicles < 3500 kg. Trucks: all vehicles > 3500 kg.
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Table B.1: DiD estimates on traffic volume by 15 min. intervals. 2 years pre/post
Rush hours Non-rush hours
Dependent variable: All day All Morning Evening +/-30 min Other
# vehicles/15 minute interval (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Passenger cars.
Post × weekday -74.52∗∗∗ -442.1∗∗∗ -440.7∗∗∗ -432.1∗∗∗ 212.5∗∗∗ -12.92
(9.701) (22.53) (28.62) (25.50) (19.65) (7.933)
Observations 87518 16416 9122 7294 7294 63808
Mean depvar (pre, weekday) 1520 2902 3021 2753 2143 1093
Change (%) -4.90 -15.23 -14.59 -15.70 9.92 -1.18
Panel B: Trucks.
Post × weekday -3.146∗∗∗ -4.920∗∗∗ -4.999∗∗∗ -4.840∗∗∗ -4.686∗∗∗ -2.507∗∗∗
(0.494) (0.963) (1.138) (1.013) (0.827) (0.396)
Observations 87518 16416 9122 7294 7294 63808
Mean depvar (pre, weekday) 112 202 218 183 173 81
Change (%) -2.81 -2.43 -2.30 -2.64 -2.70 -3.08
Weather controls (X ′itγ ) X X X X X X
Month × year FE (λym) X X X X X X
Day-of-week × time-of-day FE (θdi) X X X X X X
Length of time interval (hours) 24 4.5 2.5 2 2 17.5
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered on week.
Notes: Table shows results from 2×6 separate regressions. Dependent variable is the number of vehicles passing the toll
gates in Bergen during a 15 minute interval. Post×weekday refers to the β coefficient estimated from Equation 1. Column
headings indicate the sample used in each regression. “Rush hours” refer to the intervals 06:30-08:59 (morning) and 14:30-16:29
(evening). For non-rush hours, “+/- 30 min” refers to the 30 minute intervals right before and after rush hours. “Other”
refers to the remaining non-rush hours (i.e., 9:30-13:59 and 17:00-05:59). Sample is restricted to 730 days pre and post policy
implementation. Passenger cars: all vehicles < 3500 kg. Trucks: all vehicles > 3500 kg.
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B.2.2 1 year before and after Feb 1 2016
Table B.2 shows results when the sample is restricted to 365 days pre/post policy
implementation. Results from this table are almost identical to Table 2.
Figure B.5: DiD estimates on traffic volume by 15 min. intervals. 1 year pre/post
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Notes: Figures plots treatment effects estimated from from equation 1, where regressions are run separately for
each 15 minute increment. Sample includes +/- 365 days of the treatment date. Whiskers indicate 95% confidence
intervals. Gray shaded areas indicate rush hours. Traffic is measured as total number of cars passing the toll
cordon every 15 minutes. Standard errors are clustered at the week level. Passenger cars: all vehicles < 3500 kg.
Trucks: all vehicles > 3500 kg.
9
Table B.2: DiD estimates on traffic volume by 15 min. intervals. 1 year pre/post
Rush hours Non-rush hours
Dependent variable: All day All Morning Evening +/-30 min Other
# vehicles/15 minute interval (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All vehicles.
Post × weekday -74.70∗∗∗ -468.0∗∗∗ -475.4∗∗∗ -458.2∗∗∗ 277.3∗∗∗ -13.24
(11.94) (23.00) (26.39) (30.83) (20.11) (10.92)
Observations 43948 8244 4580 3664 3664 32040
Mean depvar (pre, weekday) 1627 3072 3205 2906 2329 1174
Change (%) -4.59 -15.24 -14.83 -15.77 11.91 -1.13
Panel B: Passenger cars.
Post × weekday -70.60∗∗∗ -459.5∗∗∗ -466.4∗∗∗ -450.1∗∗∗ 282.7∗∗∗ -10.41
(11.56) (22.17) (25.65) (30.17) (19.46) (10.70)
Observations 43948 8244 4580 3664 3664 32040
Mean depvar (pre, weekday) 1514 2868 2986 2721 2155 1093
Change (%) -4.66 -16.02 -15.62 -16.54 13.11 -0.95
Panel C: Trucks.
Post × weekday -4.107∗∗∗ -8.484∗∗∗ -8.928∗∗∗ -8.089∗∗∗ -5.327∗∗∗ -2.826∗∗∗
(0.736) (1.350) (1.498) (1.429) (1.186) (0.595)
Observations 43948 8244 4580 3664 3664 32040
Mean depvar (pre, weekday) 112 203 219 184 174 82
Change (%) -3.66 -4.17 -4.08 -4.38 -3.06 -3.46
Weather controls (X ′itγ ) X X X X X X
Month × year FE (λym) X X X X X X
Day-of-week × time-of-day FE (θdi) X X X X X X
Length of time interval (hours) 24 4.5 2.5 2 2 17.5
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered on week.
Notes: Table shows results from 18 separate regressions. Dependent variable is vehicles passing toll gates in Bergen
during a 15 minute interval. Post×weekday refers to the β coefficient estimated from Equation 1. Column headings
indicate the sample used in each regression. “Rush hours” refer to the intervals 06:30-08:59 (morning) and 14:30-
16:29 (evening). For non-rush hours, “+/- 30 min” refers to the 30 minute intervals right before and after rush
hours. “Other” refers to the remaining non-rush hours (i.e., 9:30-13:59 and 17:00-05:59). Sample is restricted to
365 days pre and post policy implementation. Passenger cars: all vehicles < 3500 kg. Trucks: all vehicles > 3500
kg.
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B.2.3 Different aggregation levels
Table B.3 shows results for three different aggregation levels: daily observations
(N = 656); toll gate specific observations on a daily level (N = 9, 182); and toll gate
specific observations on a 15 minute resolution (N = 850, 004). The point estimates
will naturally be very different since the observational unit is changed, but the table
indicates that predicted percentage changes are almost identical. Furthermore, all
coefficients except those in column (6) are significant at the 0.01 level.
Table B.3: DiD, different aggregation levels. 2 years pre/post.
Rush hours Non-rush hours
Dependent variable: All day All Morning Evening +/-30 min Other
# vehicles (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Daily.
Post × weekday -7218.6∗∗∗ -7982.8∗∗∗ -4444.7∗∗∗ -3533.6∗∗∗ 1662.1∗∗∗ -394.0
(1099.9) (446.5) (302.1) (216.1) (162.7) (760.1)
Observations 915 914 913 912 914 915
Mean depvar (pre, weekday) 156666 55873 32392 23486 18534 82020
Change (%) -4.61 -14.29 -13.72 -15.05 8.97 -0.48
Panel B: Toll gate level, daily.
Post × weekday -517.8∗∗∗ -567.9∗∗∗ -323.9∗∗∗ -248.2∗∗∗ 119.6∗∗∗ -68.52
(76.58) (31.58) (20.23) (15.08) (11.46) (47.53)
Observations 12807 12790 12766 12758 12791 12807
Mean depvar (pre, weekday) 11193 3992 2316 1679 1324 5877
Change (%) -4.63 -14.22 -13.98 -14.79 9.03 -1.17
Panel C: Toll gate level, 15 minute resolution.
Post × weekday -5.796∗∗∗ -32.58∗∗∗ -33.43∗∗∗ -30.74∗∗∗ 15.16∗∗∗ -1.200∗∗
(0.719) (1.626) (2.035) (1.800) (1.411) (0.575)
Observations 1186729 228343 126367 101976 101165 857221
Mean depvar (pre, weekday) 120.91 222.01 231.68 209.92 166.02 88.19
Change (%) -4.79 -14.68 -14.43 -14.65 9.13 -1.36
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered on week.
Notes: The outcome variable is the total number of vehicles passing toll gates. The specifications are the same
as the main specifications in Table 2, but fixed effects are modified to take into account differences in aggregation
levels. In panel A, observations are daily and regressions include month×year and day-of-week fixed effects. In
panel B, observations are daily on the toll gate level, and regressions include month×year×toll gate and day-of-
week×toll gate fixed effects. In panel C observations are per toll gate per 15 minute interval, and regressions
include month×year×toll gate and day-of-week×time-of-day×toll gate fixed effects.
11
B.2.4 Different model specifications
Table B.4 shows that the main results are not sensitive to the level of the fixed
effects.
Table B.4: DiD, different fixed effects. 2 years pre/post.
Different levels of fixed effects:
# vehicles (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All day -82.17∗∗∗ -75.39∗∗∗ -74.45∗∗∗ -77.09∗∗∗ -70.43∗∗∗
(27.25) (10.90) (9.192) (9.810) (9.326)
Rush hours:
All -440.7∗∗∗ -436.1∗∗∗ -432.1∗∗∗ -444.9∗∗∗ -421.3∗∗∗
(30.09) (29.46) (22.11) (22.20) (21.80)
Morning rush -445.6∗∗∗ -448.1∗∗∗ -425.0∗∗∗ -448.4∗∗∗ -422.0∗∗∗
(30.11) (30.20) (30.03) (29.78) (30.94)
Afternoon rush -437.6∗∗∗ -435.6∗∗∗ -427.6∗∗∗ -432.4∗∗∗ -411.4∗∗∗
(25.78) (25.79) (24.48) (26.01) (25.28)
Non-rush hours:
+/-30 min 192.5∗∗∗ 210.8∗∗∗ 212.2∗∗∗ 210.8∗∗∗ 221.9∗∗∗
(29.60) (20.94) (18.46) (19.47) (18.36)
Other -19.69 -14.39 -15.26∗∗ -15.40∗ -13.27∗
(27.60) (9.985) (7.249) (7.989) (7.235)
Weather controls X X X X X







* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered on week.
Notes: The outcome variable is the total number of vehicles passing toll gates each 15 minute interval. The
specifications are the same as the main specifications in Table 2, but with varying levels of fixed effects column-wise.
Each coefficient is from a separate regression (30 regressions in total). DoW: “day-of-week”, ToD: “Time-of-day”.
Columns (1) and (2) have more aggregated (i.e. fewer) fixed effects than the main specification. Columns (3)-(5)
have additional fixed effects. Note for example that the most detailed specification (5) will have at most four
observations for each fixed effect in the second set (time-of-day×day-of-week×week-of-year; one observation for
each time interval each year).
12
B.2.5 Placebo intervention: 1 year pre/post Feb 1st, 2015.
Figure B.6 presents estimated effects of placebo treatments, assuming that the con-
gestion charge took place February 1st 2015, i.e. one year earlier. These placebo
treatments are estimated on a dataset that includes 365 days pre/post the placebo
treatment date, since we don’t have access to traffic data earlier than 2014. The
estimated effect of the placebo treatment is insignificantly different from zero for
most of the 96 estimated coefficients, increasing our confidence in the fact that
the estimated pre/post weekend/weekday difference in our main specification is not
driven by changes over time in unobservables affecting traffic during weekends and
weekdays differently.
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Figure B.6: Total traffic volume by 15 min. intervals, DiD estimates.
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Notes: Figures plots treatment effects estimated from from equation 1, assuming the policy took place Feb 1 2015
(“placebo treatment” one year earlier’). Regressions are run separately for each 15 minute increment. Sample
includes +/- 365 days of the placebo treatment date. Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. Gray shaded
areas indicate rush hours. Traffic is measured as total number of cars passing the toll cordon every 15 minutes.
Standard errors are clustered on week. Passenger cars: all vehicles < 3500 kg. Trucks: all vehicles > 3500 kg.
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B.3 Spatial spillovers
Cars driving into the center of Bergen are not able to avoid toll charges. However,
cars passing Bergen have alternative routes to avoid the cordon toll completely. This
allows us to examine potential spatial spillover effects.
The two main routes to avoid toll payments, depending on which direction the
car is coming from, are displayed in Figure B.7.56 The toll gates avoided by the
alternative routes are marked as red triangles (See Figure 1 for the location of all
toll gates of the cordon toll).
Figure B.7: Alternatives for bypassing toll gates for transit cars
(a) North-south direction. (b) South-west direction.
Notes: Blue lines are routes around Bergen that avoid the cordon toll completely. Red triangles display the relevant
toll gates. Green circles mark traffic censors from which we obtain traffic data. Source: Google Maps.
Cars passing Bergen in the north-south direction have two alternatives: either
driving on E39 through the center of Bergen city and the cordon toll, or following
the road E16/580 to the west of Bergen avoiding the cordon toll completely – see
Figure B.7a. This route is 6 minutes longer.
Cars passing Bergen in the south-west direction are also able to avoid the toll
cordon by taking roads E39/556 rather than the direct tunnel under the strait (road
557). This is a detour of 9 minutes for cars arriving from the south-west, as the
route illustrated in Figure B.7b. However, for cars arriving from the south-east (e.g.
from E39) this route is only about one minute longer.
To examine spatial spillovers we collect vehicle count data from the traffic sensors
that are marked as green dots in the figure above. These data are hourly and publicly
56We are grateful to the Norwegian Public Roads Administration for making us aware of these
alternative routes, see e.g. NPRA (2018). Note also that as of April 6th 2019, 15 new toll gates
were put in operation. These toll gates cover the alternative routes displayed in Figure B.7, making
it infeasible to avoid tolls under the current scheme.
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Notes: Figure plots treatment effects estimated from from equation 1, where β is allowed to vary by hourly
increments. Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. Gray shaded areas indicate rush hours. Traffic is measured
as total number of cars registered by the traffic censors in both directions each hour. Standard errors are clustered
at the week level.
available.57
A limiting factor is that not much traffic count data is available pre policy
implementation. For the north-south direction, we have hourly data from September
9th 2015 and onwards. To balance out seasonal variation pre-post, we therefore
focus on the period September 9th to January 31st. This gives us one pre period
and two post periods. For the south-west direction, we have data for a whole year
pre policy and two whole years after.58 Note that as the data is hourly, several of the
observations contain 30 minutes during rush hours and 30 minutes during non-rush.
For the north-south direction, Figure B.8 indicates small treatment effects that
are similar in magnitude during the morning and evening rush hours. However only
the effects during the morning rush are significantly larger than zero. The effect is
more marked and larger in magnitude for the south-west direction, and all hourly
estimates that (partly) cover rush hours are significantly larger than zero. The effect
is slightly larger during the morning rush.
Table B.5 illustrates effects for selected time intervals. We estimate the spatial
spillover to be around 1,000 vehicles per day.59
57We use data from the censors “Kr̊akenes” and “Indre Arna EV16”, which can be accessed
here: https://www.vegvesen.no/trafikkdata/start/. Note that data from several other traffic
sensors along the same routes are available; however, the time periods for which data can be
accessed is relatively limited and different for each sensor. We found these sensors to have data
available for the most sensible time periods pre/post policy implementation.
58Apart from the period length, data selection follows the same steps as the toll gate data. This
means that the same observations are removed due to holidays.
59The “all day” regression indicates that the increase in numbers of vehicles per day is (5.65 +
38.27)× 24 = 1, 054. The regression for the six hourly intervals covering rush hours indicates that
the number of vehicles per day during rush is (31.4 + 125.3)× 6 = 940.
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Table B.5: DiD estimates on traffic volume
Dependent variable: All day Rush hours Other
# vehicles per hour 0:00-23:59 Both 6:00-8:59 14:00-16:59 17-06, 09-14
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: North-south.
Post × weekday 5.653 31.40∗ 42.87∗∗∗ 21.03 -2.104
(7.762) (15.55) (8.977) (26.30) (6.594)
Observations 8385 2097 1043 1054 6288
Mean depvar (pre, weekday) 718.40 1329.67 1042.33 1612.77 514.92
Change (%) 0.79 2.36 4.11 1.30 -0.41
Panel B: South-west.
Post × weekday 38.27∗∗∗ 125.3∗∗∗ 153.5∗∗∗ 103.6∗∗∗ 10.10
(8.632) (18.24) (22.32) (22.63) (7.975)
Observations 16063 4016 2007 2009 12047
Mean depvar (pre, weekday) 1014.38 1918.47 1703.28 2133.35 712.85
Change (%) 3.77 6.53 9.01 4.86 1.42
Weather controls (X ′itγ ) X X X X X
Month × year FE (λym) X X X X X
Day-of-week × time-of-day FE (θdi) X X X X X
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered on week.
Notes: The outcome variable is the total number of vehicles driving on the road in both directions. The specifica-
tions are the same as the main specifications in Table 2, but time periods are defined differently since only hourly
data is available.
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Appendix C Air pollution
C.1 Data and descriptives
C.1.1 Summary statistics
Table C.1: Summary statistics air pollution and weather. All days of the week.
Bergen
mean sd min max count
NO2 38.83 30.44 0 235 33,332
PM10 16.53 13.74 0 851 33,600
air temperature 8.92 5.78 -9 31 33,903
precipitation 0.28 0.77 0 27 33,179
wind speed 3.56 2.35 0 20 33,903
wind direction 197.57 80.98 0 360 33,903
wind direction (1-4) 2.76 0.98 1 4 33,903
inversion 0.04 0.20 0 1 33,903
Table C.2: Summary statistics air pollution and weather. Tuesday-Thursday.
Bergen
mean sd min max count
NO2 43.61 32.35 0 235 14,102
PM10 18.06 14.48 0 230 14,343
air temperature 8.96 5.76 -9 31 14,514
precipitation 0.29 0.81 0 27 14,191
wind speed 3.53 2.32 0 17 14,514
wind direction 197.25 81.09 0 358 14,514
wind direction (1-4) 2.75 0.99 1 4 14,514
inversion 0.05 0.22 0 1 14,514
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C.1.2 Scatter plots




Notes: Figures show hourly air pollution readings from the station “Danmarksplass” in Bergen.
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C.1.3 Air pollution 1 year before and after Feb 1 2016
Figure C.2: Ambient air pollution 1 year before and after Feb 1 2016
(a) NO2. Weekday (b) NO2. Weekend
(c) PM10. Weekday (d) PM10. Weekend
Notes: Figure shows average ambient air pollution over the course of a day for the pollution monitoring station
located at Danmarksplass in Bergen. Values are based on 60 minute intervals. Panel (a) and (c) show averages
for weekdays (Tuesday-Thursday) and panels (b) and (d) show averages for weekends (Saturday-Sunday). Dashed
lines indicate averages for the 365 days prior to policy implementation (Feb 1 2016). Solid lines indicate averages
for the 365 days post policy implementation. Gray shaded areas indicate rush hours. Note that congestion charging
is not active during weekends. Pollution is measured as micrograms per cubic meter of air(µg/m3). See Appendix
Figure C.3 for ambient air pollution 365 days pre and post Feb 1 2015 (”Placebo intervention”).
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C.1.4 Placebo intervention
Figure C.3: Ambient air pollution, 1 year before and after Feb 1 2015 (“Placebo
intervention”)
(a) NO2. Weekday (b) NO2. Weekend
(c) PM10. Weekday (d) PM10. Weekend
Notes: Figure shows ambient air pollution on weekdays (Tuesday-Thursday) for the pollution monitoring station
located at Danmarksplass in Bergen. Pollution is measured as micrograms per cubic meter of air(µg/m3). Ambient
air quality standards for NO2 (annual mean): 40 µg/m3. Ambient air quality standards for PM10 (annual mean):
25 µg/m3. The variable “hour” on the x-axis indicate the start of the time interval, e.g., hour 6 indicates the time
interval 06:00-06:59.
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C.2 Supporting results and robustness checks
C.2.1 Results based on 1 year pre and post Feb 1 2016
Figure C.4 and Table C.3 shows results when the sample is restricted to 365 days
pre/post policy implementation. Estimated daily treatment effects on NO2 are very
similar to results in our main specification, where we use a period of 2 years before
and after policy implementation. As is our main results, we find no significant effects
on PM10.
Figure C.4: DiD estimates on air pollution (µg/m3), by 60 min. intervals. 1 year
pre/post
(a) NO2: Treatment date: Feb 1, 2016 (b) PM10: Treatment date: Feb 1, 2016
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Table C.3: DID estimates on NO2 and PM10. 1 year pre/post
24 hours Daytime Midday Rush Evening Night
Dependent variable: 00-23 05-22 06-17 6-9,14-16 18-23 00-05
ambient air pollution (µg/m3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: NO2
Post × weekday -3.089∗ -3.064 -5.387∗∗ -5.702∗∗∗ 1.991 -2.218
(1.812) (1.945) (2.038) (2.066) (2.686) (1.979)
Observations 10865 8132 5396 3157 2736 2733
Mean depvar (pre-weekday) 47.40 55.60 61.40 64.49 42.65 24.64
Change (%) -6.52 -5.51 -8.77 -8.84 4.67 -9.00
Panel B: PM10
Post × weekday -0.864 -0.725 -0.260 0.250 -1.597 -0.396
(1.337) (1.541) (1.665) (1.586) (1.689) (1.016)
Observations 10892 8170 5436 3180 2737 2719
Mean depvar (pre-weekday) 18.19 20.32 21.63 21.22 17.91 11.57
Change (%) -4.75 -3.57 -1.20 1.18 -8.92 -3.43
Weather controls (X ′itγ) X X X X X X
Month×year FE (λym) X X X X X X
Day of week×time-of-day FE (θdi) X X X X X X
Notes: Table shows results from 12 separate regressions. Dependent variable is ambient air pollution measured as mean
levels of NO2 or PM10 (µg/m3) during a 60 minute interval. Post × Weekday refers to the coefficient X estimated from
equation X. Column headings indicate the sample used in each regression. Rush hours refers to the intervals 06:00-09:59
(morning) and 14:00-16:59 (evening). Non-rush hours, +/- 60 min refers to the 60 minutes right before and after rush
hours (i.e., 05:00-05:59, 10:00-10:59, 13:00-13:59, 17:00-17:59). Non-rush hours, other refers to the remaining non-rush
hours (i.e., 10:00-12:59 and 18:00-04:59). Sample is restricted to 365 days pre and post policy implementation. Standard
errors are clustered on week.
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C.2.2 Different model specification: fixed effects
Table C.4 shows average daily treatment effects for NO2 and PM10 using different
specifications of fixed effects. From Panel A, we see that our main results on NO2 is
not sensitive to the level of the fixed effects; the treatment effect ranges from 3.064
to 3.180 µg/m3 (or 6.52 to 6.77%, respectively). For PM10 the estimated treat-
ment effect becomes significant under the most conservative specification (column
7), where we only exploit variation within a week instead of within a month (see
Panel B).
Table C.4: DID estimates on NO2 and PM10. 2 years pre/post
Dependent variable: Daily treatment effects
ambient air pollution (µg/m3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)* (6) (7)
Panel A: NO2
Post × weekday -3.180∗∗ -3.082∗∗ -3.099∗∗ -3.075∗∗ -3.064∗∗ -3.120∗∗ -3.153∗∗
(1.502) (1.495) (1.497) (1.387) (1.369) (1.339) (1.324)
Observations 21438 21438 21438 21438 21438 21438 21109
Mean depvar (pre-weekday) 47.01 47.01 47.01 47.01 47.01 47.01 46.99
Change (%) -6.77 -6.56 -6.59 -6.54 -6.52 -6.64 -6.71
Panel B: PM10
Post × weekday -1.311 -1.174 -1.173 -1.187 -1.185 -1.389 -1.634∗∗
(0.920) (0.841) (0.840) (0.816) (0.809) (0.848) (0.807)
Observations 21624 21624 21624 21624 21624 21624 21358
Mean depvar (pre-weekday) 18.81 18.81 18.81 18.81 18.81 18.81 18.83
Change (%) -6.97 -6.24 -6.23 -6.31 -6.30 -7.38 -8.68
Weather controls X X X X X X X
Post X X X X X X X
Weekday X X X X X X X
Month × year X X X X
DoW X X
ToD X
DoW × ToD X X
Week × DoW × ToD X
Week × year X X
Notes: Table shows results from 12 separate regressions. Dependent variable is ambient air pollution measured as
mean levels of NO2 or PM10 (µg/m3) during a 60 minute interval. Estimated effects reflect daily average effects.
DoW is short for day of week (Monday-Thursday). ToD is short for time of day (24 hours). Sample is restricted
to 2 years pre and post policy implementation. Standard errors are clustered on week. The coefficients in column
(5) correspond to the main estimates in column (1) in Table 3.
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C.2.3 Different model specifications: weather controls
Figure C.5 plots treatment effects for NO2 and PM10 using different combinations of
weather controls. Corresponding regression coefficients are shown in Table C.5 and
Table C.6. The magnitude of the estimated treatment effects are relatively stable
across the different specifications. What the weather variables are primarily doing
is tightening the confidence intervals. However, adding wind direction to the set of
controls (specification #5) does seem to increase the magnitude of the treatment
coefficients somewhat.
Figure C.5: DiD estimates on air pollution (µg/m3). Different weather controls
(a) NO2: All day (b) PM10: All day
(c) NO2: Rush hours (d) PM10: Rush hours
Notes: Each subfigure shows results from 8 separate regressions. Dependent variable is ambient air pollution measured
as mean levels of NO2 or PM10 (µg/m3) during a 60 minute interval. Panel (a) and (b) show daily average effects while
Panel (c) and (d) show results for rush hours. Whiskers show 95 % confidence intervals. Except for weather controls, the
model specification is the same as in the main regression table (Table 3). Standard errors are clustered on week. Temp
refers to a polynomial of air temperature of degree 3; Rain refers to a polynominal precipitation of degree 2; Temp*Rain
refers to an interaction of temperature and precipitation; Wind speed refers to a polynominal of wind speed of degree 2;
WInd direction refers to four dummies for wind direction (north, south, east and west); Wind direction * speed refers to
an interaction between wind direction and wind speed; Inversion refers to a dummy variable for inversion episodes. We
estimate two sets of each of these weather control variables; one for weekdays and one for weekends.
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Table C.5: DID estimates on NO2 and PM10. 2 years pre/post
Dependent variable: Daily treatment effects
ambient air pollution (µg/m3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)*
Panel A: NO2
Post × weekday -3.276 -3.494 -3.187 -3.255 -5.022∗∗ -2.821∗ -2.985∗∗ -3.064∗∗
(3.660) (2.334) (2.222) (2.218) (2.101) (1.396) (1.376) (1.369)
Observations 21530 21530 21438 21438 21438 21438 21438 21438
Mean depvar (pre-weekday) 46.95 46.95 47.01 47.01 47.01 47.01 47.01 47.01
Change (%) -6.98 -7.44 -6.78 -6.92 -10.68 -6.00 -6.35 -6.52
Panel B: PM10
Post × weekday -0.506 -0.505 -0.542 -0.581 -1.273 -1.061 -1.124 -1.185
(1.222) (1.017) (0.955) (0.949) (0.900) (0.828) (0.814) (0.809)
Observations 21716 21716 21624 21624 21624 21624 21624 21624
Mean depvar (pre-weekday) 18.83 18.83 18.81 18.81 18.81 18.81 18.81 18.81
Change (%) -2.69 -2.68 -2.88 -3.09 -6.77 -5.64 -5.98 -6.30
Temperature X X X X X X X
Precipitation X X X X X X
Temperature × precipitation X X X X X
Wind direction X X X X
Wind speed X X X
Wind direction × wind speed X X
Inversion X
Notes: Table shows results from 16 separate regressions. Dependent variable is ambient air pollution measured as
mean levels of NO2 or PM10 (µg/m3) during a 60 minute interval. Estimated effects reflect daily average effects.
Sample is restricted to 2 years pre and post policy implementation. Except for the weather controls, the model
specification is the same as in the main regression table (Table 3). Standard errors are clustered on week. Temp refers
to a polynomial of air temperature of degree 3; Rain refers to a polynominal precipitation of degree 2; Temp*Rain
refers to an interaction of temperature and precipitation; Wind speed refers to a polynomial of wind speed of degree
2; Wind direction refers to four dummies for wind direction (north, south, east and west); Wind direction×speed
refers to an interaction between wind direction and wind speed; Inversion refers to a dummy variable for inversion
episodes. We estimate two sets of each of these weather control variables; one for weekdays and one for weekends.The
coefficients in column (8) correspond to the main estimates in column (1) in Table 3.
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Table C.6: DID estimates on NO2 and PM10. 2 years pre/post. Rush hours only
Dependent variable: Daily treatment effects
ambient air pollution (µg/m3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)*
Panel A: NO2
Post × weekday -5.828 -6.406∗∗ -5.540∗∗ -5.614∗∗ -8.413∗∗∗ -6.564∗∗∗ -6.880∗∗∗ -6.813∗∗∗
(4.028) (2.641) (2.451) (2.416) (2.324) (1.687) (1.648) (1.658)
Observations 6255 6255 6227 6227 6227 6227 6227 6227
Mean depvar (pre-weekday) 63.70 63.70 63.78 63.78 63.78 63.78 63.78 63.78
Change (%) -9.15 -10.06 -8.69 -8.80 -13.19 -10.29 -10.79 -10.68
Panel B: PM10
Post × weekday -1.045 -1.054 -0.839 -0.891 -1.933 -1.834 -1.768 -1.735
(1.543) (1.430) (1.308) (1.297) (1.252) (1.122) (1.119) (1.115)
Observations 6341 6341 6314 6314 6314 6314 6314 6314
Mean depvar (pre-weekday) 21.76 21.76 21.76 21.76 21.76 21.76 21.76 21.76
Change (%) -4.80 -4.84 -3.86 -4.09 -8.89 -8.43 -8.13 -7.97
Temperature X X X X X X X
Precipitation X X X X X X
Temperature × precipitation X X X X X
Wind direction X X X X
Wind speed X X X
Wind direction × wind speed X X
Inversion X
Notes: Table shows results from 16 separate regressions. Dependent variable is ambient air pollution measured as
mean levels of NO2 or PM10 (µg/m3) during a 60 minute interval. Estimated effects reflect daily average effects.
Sample is restricted to 2 years pre and post policy implementation and restricted to rush hours only. Except for
the weather controls, the model specification is the same as in the main regression table (Table 3). Standard errors
are clustered on week. Temp refers to a polynomial of air temperature of degree 3; Rain refers to a polynominal
precipitation of degree 2; Temp*Rain refers to an interaction of temperature and precipitation; Wind speed refers
to a polynomial of wind speed of degree 2; Wind direction refers to four dummies for wind direction (north, south,
east and west); Wind direction×speed refers to an interaction between wind direction and wind speed; Inversion
refers to a dummy variable for inversion episodes. We estimate two sets of each of these weather control variables;
one for weekdays and one for weekends.The coefficients in column (8) correspond to the main estimates in column
(1) in Table 3.
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C.2.4 Placebo intervention: 1 year pre/post Feb 1st, 2015
Figure C.6 and Table C.7 presents estimated effects of placebo treatments on air
pollution, assuming that the congestion charge took place February 1st 2015, i.e.
one year earlier. These placebo treatments are estimated on a dataset that includes
365 days pre/post the placebo treatment date. For each of the panels in Figure C.6,
estimated effect of the placebo treatment is insignificantly different from zero for
23 of the 24 estimated coefficients, increasing our confidence that our main results
are not driven by changes over time in unobservables affecting air pollution during
weekends and weekdays differently.
Figure C.6: DID estimates on air pollution by 60 min. intervals. 1 year pre/post
(a) NO2: Placebo: Feb 1, 2015 (b) PM10: Placebo: Feb 1, 2015
Notes: Figure plots the coefficient β estimated from equation ??, but where β is allowed to vary by the hour of the day. Sample
is restricted to 2 years before and after policy implementation (Feb 1 2016). Gray shaded areas indicate rush hours. Note that
congestion charging is not active during weekends. Pollution is measured as micrograms per cubic meter of air(µg/m3). Standard
errors are clustered on week.
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Table C.7: DID estimates on NO2 and PM10. Placebo intervention
24 hours Daytime Midday Rush Evening Night
Dependent variable: 00-23 05-22 06-17 6-9,14-16 18-23 00-05
ambient air pollution (µg/m3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: NO2
Post × weekday 0.274 -0.877 -0.245 -0.0626 -3.196 2.330
(1.656) (1.789) (1.832) (1.920) (2.456) (1.967)
Observations 10683 7995 5301 3102 2693 2689
Mean depvar (pre-weekday) 49.18 57.54 64.03 67.06 43.56 25.70
Change (%) 0.56 -1.52 -0.38 -0.09 -7.34 9.07
Panel B: PM10
Post × weekday -1.097 -1.825 -2.596 -2.703 -0.121 0.362
(1.726) (1.926) (1.968) (1.965) (2.187) (1.308)
Observations 10910 8186 5449 3188 2738 2723
Mean depvar (pre-weekday) 20.52 22.93 24.38 23.87 20.32 13.00
Change (%) -5.35 -7.96 -10.65 -11.32 -0.60 2.78
Weather controls (X ′itγ) X X X X X X
Month×year FE (λym) X X X X X X
Day of week×time-of-day FE (θdi) X X X X X X
Notes: Table shows results from 12 separate regressions. Dependent variable is ambient air pollution measured
as mean levels of NO2 or PM10 (µg/m3) during a 60 minute interval. Post × Weekday refers to the coefficient X
estimated from equation X. Column headings indicate the sample used in each regression. Rush hours refers to the
intervals 06:00-09:59 (morning) and 14:00-16:59 (evening). Non-rush hours, +/- 60 min refers to the 60 minutes
right before and after rush hours (i.e., 05:00-05:59, 10:00-10:59, 13:00-13:59, 17:00-17:59). Non-rush hours, other
refers to the remaining non-rush hours (i.e., 10:00-12:59 and 18:00-04:59). Sample is restricted to 365 days pre and
post policy implementation. Standard errors are clustered on week.
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C.3 Alternative DiD strategy: Bergen vs. other cities
In this section, we estimate effects of the congestion charge on air pollution by ex-
ploiting differences across cities, pre and post policy implementation. When Bergeni
is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the monitoring station located in Bergen and
postt is a dummy variable equal to 1 after February 1st 2016, the DiD estimator can
be written as:
yikst = βpostt ×Bergen+X ′istγ + σs + λywd + θdis + εikt, (6)
where yikst denotes hourly (i) concentrations of pollutant k ∈ {NO2, PM10} mea-
sured at station s on date t; X ′it is a vector of station-specific weather controls; σs
are monitoring station fixed effects; λywd denotes year×week number×day-of-week
fixed effects; θdis denotes station-specific day-of-week×time-of-day fixed effects; and
εikt is the idiosyncratic error term. The DiD estimate is captured by the coefficient
β.
We use an estimating sample consisting of 26 pollution monitoring stations lo-
cated near roads in different areas around Norway. We restrict the sample to week-
days only (Monday-Friday) and drop holidays and summer months. As a similar
policy was introduced in Oslo in November 2017, we restrict our sample to 1 year
pre and post Feb 1 2016. This means that our sample covers the period Feb 1 2015
to January 31 2017. The vector of controls are similar to the main specification in
Section 3.4, with the exception that we allow effects of weather controls to vary by
station. We also need to drop the inversion control as we only have data for Bergen
from our data source. Standard errors are clustered on week number and station
ID.
Table C.8 shows results from the DiD estimation. From panel (a) column (1)
we see that the congestion charge led to a 4.2 µg/m3 decrease in the concentration
of NO2, corresponding to a 9% decline. This estimate is around 1.1 µg/m3, or
2.5 percentage points, higher that the main result presented in Table 3. While
the decrease in µg/m3 is highest during rush hours, the percentage reductions are
relatively similar for the 6 time period throughout the day. For PM10, we find no
significant effect of the Bergen congestion charge; see panel (b) in Table C.8.
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Table C.8: DID estimates on NO2 and PM10. Bergen vs. other cities. Level
24 hours Daytime Midday Rush Evening Night
Dependent variable: 00-23 05-22 06-17 6-9,14-16 18-23 00-05
ambient air pollution (µg/m3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: NO2
Post × Bergen -3.990∗∗ -4.351∗∗ -4.992∗∗ -5.327∗∗ -3.364∗ -2.162
(1.502) (1.591) (1.786) (2.000) (1.737) (1.479)
Observations 177545 132772 87891 51509 44888 44766
Mean depvar (pre-weekday) 47.40 55.60 61.41 64.49 42.65 24.64
Change (%) -8.42 -7.83 -8.13 -8.26 -7.89 -8.77
Panel B: PM10
Post × Bergen -0.420 -0.260 -0.193 1.162 0.0710 -0.346
(2.066) (2.609) (2.710) (2.653) (2.885) (0.769)
Observations 179934 135221 89996 52561 45275 44663
Mean depvar (pre-weekday) 18.29 20.46 21.85 21.58 17.91 11.57
Change (%) -2.29 -1.27 -0.88 5.38 0.40 -2.99
Weather controls (X ′itγ) X X X X X X
Station FE (σs) X X X X X X
Post X X X X X X
Day of week×week×year FE ( λywd) X X X X X X
Station×day of week×time-of-day FE (θdis) X X X X X X
Notes: Table shows results from 12 separate regressions. Dependent variable is ambient air pollution measured as mean
levels of NO2 or PM10 (µg/m3) during a 60 minute interval. Post × Bergen refers to the coefficient β estimated from
equation 6. Column headings indicate the sample used in each regression. Rush hours refers to the intervals 06:00-09:59
(morning) and 14:00-16:59 (evening). Non-rush hours, +/- 60 min refers to the 60 minutes right before and after rush
hours (i.e., 05:00-05:59, 10:00-10:59, 13:00-13:59, 17:00-17:59). Non-rush hours, other refers to the remaining non-rush
hours (i.e., 10:00-12:59 and 18:00-04:59). Sample is restricted to 365 days pre and post policy implementation. Standard
errors are clustered on week.
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Appendix D Car ownership
D.1 Data and descriptives
D.1.1 The Stavanger toll cordon
Figure D.1: Map of toll gates around Stavanger
Notes: This map displays the road network in and around Stavanger, as well as the toll gates that were part of
the Stavanger cordon toll in 2014. Note that several routes into the city will pass multiple toll gates. However,
just as in Bergen cars will only pay once as long as they pass the toll gates within the same hour.
D.1.2 Toll rates in Bergen and Stavanger 2005-2017
Figure D.2 shows the toll rates in Bergen and Stavanger over the period 2005 to 2017.
The first panel displays the rates, while the second panel is the average toll exposure
within the household for paying and non-paying commuters. The toll exposure is
slightly lower than the rates because in some households not all adult members are
exposed to the cordon toll on their way to work.
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Figure D.2: Toll rates in Bergen and Stavanger
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D.1.3 Definition of treatment and control group
Paying commuters are defined as households where at least one household member
passed the toll cordon to Bergen or Stavanger (but no other toll gates) on his/her
way to work in 2014. Non-paying commuters are defined as households where all
household members had zero toll payments on their work routes in 2014. The
allocation of households to paying commuters and non-paying commuters is done
based on toll payments in 2014 - the year before the congestion charge in Bergen
was announced.
D.1.4 Sample selection
Our dataset consists of 441,451 households in either Hordaland or Rogaland county
(the counties of Bergen and Stavanger) in 2014, resulting in 3,047,853 annual obser-
vations over the years 2011-2017. Based on our empirical strategy, we restrict our
sample in the following way:
1. Household must have existed in 2014.
2. At least one household member must be employed.
3. At least one household member must have a workplace where the geographical
location is observed (i.e. non-missing work route).
4. Households must be located within 50 kilometers of the city of Bergen or
Stavanger.
5. Households must have an average work distance between 5 and 50 kilometers.
6. Households cannot have moved between 2014 and 2017.
7. Households must fall within the definitions of “paying commuter” or “non-
paying commuter” as outlined in Section D.1.3.
As treatment is defined as a time-invariant attribute on the household level, the
household must have existed in 2014 to be part of the analysis. We consider work
distances below 5 km as walking and cycling distance and hence less likely to be
affected by toll rates. The 50 km cutoff is done to ensure comparable work distances
for paying and non-paying commuters. Restriction #6 is done to ensure that all
households are assigned to the treatment or control group in a consistent manner
and have not self-selected out of the treatment group. We do not require households
to be observed during all years 2011-2017 to be included in our sample, meaning
that the dataset is an unbalanced panel.60
60Restricting the sample to households observed in all years 2011-2017 reduces the number of
observations significantly. However, results based on a balanced sample are very similar to our
main results. Results can be provided upon request.
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Applying the sample restrictions listed above leaves us with a dataset consisting
of 76,088 households over 7 years, resulting in a total of 448,196 annual observations.
Table D.1 shows how each sample selection criterion affects number of observations,
and Table D.2 show the effect on selected variable means in 2014.
Table D.1: Observations by year and sample selection criteria
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2011 406363 370232 254648 197985 133008 112947 53043
2012 414484 377820 262262 204554 137977 115072 57905
2013 422965 385675 269801 210634 142258 115898 64130
2014 441451 402609 276970 215960 146686 116540 76088
2015 447332 406767 273130 212631 145500 114320 69419
2016 451399 408620 268936 209241 143962 112629 64627
2017 463859 419919 269322 209369 144545 113296 62984
Total 3047853 2771642 1875069 1460374 993936 800702 448196
Share of population 1.00 0.91 0.62 0.48 0.33 0.26 0.15
Notes: This table shows how observations per year are reduced as various sample selection criteria are imposed.
(1) All households in the counties Hordaland and Rogaland; (2) Removing households where no individuals work;
(3) Removing households where no individuals are matched with workplace locations; (4) Removing households
located more than 50 kilometers away from Bergen/Stavanger; (5) Removing households where work distance is
not between 5 and 50 kilometers; (6) Removing households that moved between 2014 and 2017; (7) Removing
households not covered by treatment and control definitions. Column (7) is our final sample.
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Table D.2: Summary statistics by sample selection criteria, 2014
Sample mean of variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Outcomes
Electric vehicle (0/1) 0.020 0.021 0.029 0.032 0.037 0.040 0.031
Number of electric vehicles 0.021 0.022 0.029 0.033 0.038 0.041 0.032
Number of ICE vehicles 1.038 1.031 1.260 1.207 1.298 1.374 1.392
Total number of vehicles 1.058 1.053 1.290 1.240 1.336 1.415 1.425
Panel B: Journey to work variables
Toll rate (NOK/individual) 20.79 20.81 20.81 21.78 17.18 16.84 9.30
Toll rate (NOK/household) 28.39 28.46 28.46 29.92 24.02 24.07 13.88
Driving distance (km) 34.55 34.56 34.56 33.96 14.31 14.33 12.79
Driving time (min) 32.53 32.55 32.55 31.65 14.73 14.77 13.53
PT time minus driving time (min) 73.74 73.87 72.85 64.69 75.18 77.85 77.22
PT time divided by driving time 7.62 7.63 7.64 6.74 6.56 6.81 7.12
Panel C: Socio-economic variables
Couple (0/1) 0.53 0.49 0.65 0.64 0.68 0.72 0.71
Children living at home (0/1) 0.28 0.30 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.44 0.43
Persons in household 2.16 2.15 2.53 2.49 2.59 2.71 2.70
Age 48.74 46.83 43.04 42.69 42.91 44.63 44.47
Female (0/1) 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.49
Owns second home 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Employed (0/1) 0.65 0.71 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92
Retired (0/1) 0.21 0.16 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06
Income (100,000 NOK/individual) 3.52 3.62 4.08 4.16 4.21 4.32 4.32
Income (100,000 NOK/household) 5.58 5.65 6.81 6.92 7.11 7.45 7.44
Wealth (mill NOK/individual) 1.42 1.37 1.33 1.43 1.43 1.66 1.62
Wealth (mill NOK/household) 2.23 2.07 2.25 2.42 2.45 2.84 2.82
Education:
Unknown (0/1) 0.28 0.30 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.16
Less than high school (0/1) 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11
High school (0/1) 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.30
College (0/1) 0.21 0.21 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.28
University (0/1) 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15
Observations 441451 402609 276970 215960 146686 116540 76088
Notes: (1): All households in the counties Hordaland and Rogaland; (2): Removing households where no individ-
uals work; (3): Removing households where no individuals are matched with workplace locations; (4) Removing
households located more than 50 kilometers away from Bergen/Stavanger; (5): Removing households where work
distance is not between 5 and 50 kilometers; (6) Removing households that moved between 2014 and 2017; (7)
Removing households not covered by treatment and control definitions. Column (7) is our final sample.
D.1.5 Model specification and description of variables
Our dataset contains information at both the individual and household level. Individual-
level data is restricted to persons above the age of 18. In the analysis, we focus on
households as the unit of observation. This means that individual-level characteris-
tics are aggregated to the household level as described in this section.
In the main analysis, we control for the following set of variables: Dummy vari-
ables for being female, being employed, being retired, owning a second home, having
children below the age of 18, and separate dummies for education levels (unknown,
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Table D.3: Description of variables
Variable Description
Panel A: Outcome variables
BEVit Dummy variable indicating whether household i owns a battery electric
vehicle
NumBEVit The number of battery electric vehicles owned by household i
ICEVit The number of internal combustion engine vehicles owned by household
i
carsit Total number of vehicles owned by household i
Panel B: Treatment variables
Bi Dummy variable, 1 if household lives in the vicinity of Bergen; 0 if the
household lives in the vicinity of Stavanger
ci Dummy variable, 1 if at least one household member pass the toll cordon;
0 if no household members are exposed to tolls on their commute
postt Dummy variable for 2016 and later
Panel C: Control variables
coupleit Dummy variable indicating whether there is more than one adult house-
hold member
ageit Average age of adult household members
femaleit Share of adult household members that are females
employedit Share of adult household members that are employed
retiredit Share of adult household members that are retired
secondhomeit Dummy variable for whether household owns second home
personsit Number of household members, adults and children
childrenit Dummy variable for having children <18 years living at home
incomeit Average net income of adult household members. Labor and capital
income net of taxes plus other transfers
wealthit Average net wealth of adult household members. Value of capital stock
(including property) and financial assets net of outstanding debt
educ0it Dummy: all household members have unknown education
educ1it Dummy: highest education in household is less than high school
educ2it Dummy: highest education in household is high school
educ3it Dummy: highest education in household is college
educ4it Dummy: highest education in household is university
wdit Average work distance of adult employed household members in kilome-
ters. Fastest route between centroids of working and residence neighbor-
hoods
timeit Time spent in minutes associated with the commute above, according to
the speed limit
PT diffit Time to work by public transit (including expected waiting, transit and
access/egress time) minus time spent by car
PT shareit Time to work by public transit (including expected waiting, transit and
access/egress time) divided by time spent by car
θnt Neighborhood by year fixed effects for the household’s residence location
less than high school, high school, college and university). A continuous variable
for number of persons (adults and children) registered at the household. Two poly-
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nomials in age, net income, net wealth, distance to work and time to work by car.
We also include two polynomials for two variables that are meant to capture the
workplace’s accessibility by public transit – these are the absolute and the relative
time differences to get to work by public transit versus private car. All variables
except “children” and “number of household members” are individual specific, but
averaged across spouses. If a variable is missing for one of the spouses, the other
spouse’s value is used. If a variable is missing for both spouses, that household is
omitted from the regression. Finally, we let the coefficients for all variables be cou-
ple and single specific (i.e. whether the household has one or two adult members).
Descriptions of the variables are included in Table D.3.
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D.1.6 Summary statistics
Table D.4: Summary statistics 2017
Bergen Stavanger
Paying Non-paying Paying Non-paying
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Panel A: Outcomes
Electric vehicle (0/1) 0.178 0.382 0.117 0.321 0.121 0.326 0.074 0.263
Number of electric vehicles 0.187 0.415 0.124 0.351 0.127 0.352 0.078 0.280
Number of ICE vehicles 1.156 0.788 1.486 0.854 1.489 0.809 1.421 0.815
Total number of vehicles 1.343 0.831 1.610 0.858 1.616 0.815 1.499 0.824
Panel B: Journey to work variables
Toll rate (NOK/individual) 42.01 14.62 0.19 2.73 17.43 6.62 0.11 1.70
Toll rate (NOK/household) 64.32 32.57 0.37 5.22 27.02 13.59 0.21 3.24
Driving distance (km) 12.42 7.98 14.17 8.76 13.57 6.67 10.53 5.91
Driving time (min) 13.28 8.29 15.03 9.58 13.77 6.81 11.77 7.40
PT time minus driving time (min) 60.00 51.03 94.82 82.68 79.85 57.24 80.16 79.50
PT time divided by driving time 5.62 2.76 7.85 5.59 7.27 4.77 8.51 8.53
Panel C: Socio-economic variables
Couple (0/1) 0.77 0.42 0.76 0.43 0.82 0.39 0.74 0.44
Children living at home (0/1) 0.42 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.42 0.49
Persons in household 2.75 1.33 2.77 1.37 2.96 1.35 2.77 1.40
Age 48.45 11.15 48.38 11.57 47.48 10.78 48.15 11.47
Female (0/1) 0.49 0.25 0.48 0.26 0.48 0.22 0.48 0.26
Owns second home 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33
Employed (0/1) 0.93 0.18 0.89 0.20 0.92 0.18 0.90 0.20
Retired (0/1) 0.08 0.23 0.08 0.24 0.06 0.21 0.08 0.24
Income (100,000 NOK/individual) 4.50 3.43 4.12 2.20 4.81 2.78 4.62 4.62
Income (100,000 NOK/household) 7.95 5.11 7.22 4.41 8.73 5.46 8.06 8.52
Wealth (mill NOK/individual) 2.13 6.02 1.67 5.02 1.94 3.46 2.00 5.55
Wealth (mill NOK/household) 3.76 11.37 2.91 9.50 3.49 6.29 3.48 10.71
Education:
Unknown (0/1) 0.14 0.34 0.13 0.34 0.10 0.30 0.14 0.35
Less than high school (0/1) 0.06 0.24 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.31
High school (0/1) 0.23 0.42 0.37 0.48 0.31 0.46 0.30 0.46
College (0/1) 0.32 0.47 0.29 0.45 0.31 0.46 0.28 0.45
University (0/1) 0.25 0.43 0.10 0.29 0.19 0.39 0.16 0.37
Observations 10005 17906 20105 14968
Notes: (1): Paying commuters, Bergen; (2): Non-paying commuters, Bergen; (3): Paying commuters, Stavanger;
(4): Non-paying commuters, Stavanger.
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D.1.7 Paying and non-paying commuters by area
Maps display neighborhoods located within 50 kilometers of Bergen and Stavanger
by the share of the final sample that are paying/non-paying commuters. The share
of paying commuters is increasing by proximity to the toll cordon. Note that the
areas of some neighborhoods to the west mainly consist of open sea. Neighborhoods
with less than 50 households (mainly parks, woodland, mountains and bodies of
water) are removed for confidentiality reasons. Note that several neighborhoods in
or close to the city centers are too small to be visible.
Figure D.3: Share of population that is treated/non-treated
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Notes: The share of the final sample that is classified as “paying” and “non-paying” commuters in 2014, by
neighborhood.
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D.2 Supporting results and robustness checks
D.2.1 DiD and DiDiD estimates: supporting figures
Here, we show estimated treatment effects from two separate DiD regressions for
Bergen and Stavanger, where the two differences are “over time” and “between




αtci × 1{t = s}+ ηci +X ′itγ + θnt + εit. (7)
η will absorb the effect of being a paying commuter in 2014. If we let α1t (α
0
t ) denote
the estimated “paying commuter” effect for Bergen (Stavanger) in year t, the triple
difference estimate in a given year can be derived from α1t − α0t .
Figure D.4, panel (a) shows the DiD estimates for Bergen and Stavanger. The
estimated coefficients show that paying computers in both cities experiences an
increase in the electric vehicle ownership share relative to non-paying computers.
By subtracting the estimated effects for Stavanger from the true treatment effects
for Bergen, we arrive at our DiDiD estimates presented in panel (b). Figure shows
corresponding treatment effects for three additional outcome variables.
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Estimate, Bergen 95 % CI, Bergen
























2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Estimate 95 % CI
Notes: Figures on the left side plot coefficients αt estimated from equation 7, where α2014 is normalized to
zero. Figures on the right side plots the coefficients βt estimated from equation 3, where α2014 and β2014 are
normalized to zero. The outcome is a dummy variable indicating battery electric vehicle (BEVs) ownership per
household. Vertical dotted lines denote the announcement date (Feb 18th 2015), while vertical dashed lines denote
the implementation date (Feb 1st 2016). Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level.
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Estimate, Bergen 95 % CI, Bergen
Estimate, Stavanger 95 % CI, Stavanger
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Estimate 95 % CI
Notes: Figures on the left side plot coefficients αt estimated from equation 7, where α2014 is normalized to zero.
Figures on the right side plots the coefficients βt estimated from equation 3, where α2014 and β2014 are normalized
to zero. The outcome is number of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) owned per household, number of internal
combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs) owned per household and total number of vehicles owned per household for
the first, second and third row, respectively. Vertical dotted lines denote the announcement date (Feb 18th 2015),




Table D.5: DiDiD estimates with different fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Pr(BEV)
Post × Paying commuters × Bergen 0.0130∗∗ 0.0134∗∗ 0.0393∗∗∗ 0.0419∗∗∗
(0.00585) (0.00583) (0.00589) (0.00593)
Observations 376998 376997 376914 376914
Mean depvar 2014 (paying commuters, Bergen) 0.0469 0.0469 0.0469 0.0469
Mean depvar 2017 (paying commuters, Bergen) 0.1775 0.1775 0.1774 0.1774
Panel B: Number of BEVs
Post × Paying commuters × Bergen 0.0136∗∗ 0.0140∗∗ 0.0424∗∗∗ 0.0451∗∗∗
(0.00621) (0.00619) (0.00648) (0.00652)
Observations 376998 376997 376914 376914
Mean depvar 2014 (paying commuters, Bergen) 0.0482 0.0482 0.0482 0.0482
Mean depvar 2017 (paying commuters, Bergen) 0.1873 0.1873 0.1872 0.1872
Panel C: Number of ICEVs
Post × Paying commuters × Bergen -0.0429∗∗∗ -0.0392∗∗∗ -0.0360∗∗∗ -0.0422∗∗∗
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0121) (0.0119)
Observations 376998 376997 376914 376914
Mean depvar 2014 (paying commuters, Bergen) 1.1731 1.1731 1.1730 1.1730
Mean depvar 2017 (paying commuters, Bergen) 1.1554 1.1554 1.1555 1.1555
Panel D: Number of cars in total
Post × Paying commuters × Bergen -0.0293∗∗∗ -0.0252∗∗∗ 0.00633 0.00288
(0.00956) (0.00944) (0.0117) (0.0116)
Observations 376998 376997 376914 376914
Mean depvar 2014 (paying commuters, Bergen) 1.2214 1.2214 1.2212 1.2212
Mean depvar 2017 (paying commuters, Bergen) 1.3427 1.3427 1.3427 1.3427
Year FE X X
Paying commuter X X X
Paying commuter × Post X X X
Paying commuter × year FE (αtci) X
Paying commuter × Bergen (ηci ×Bi) X X X X
Bergen X
Bergen × Post X X
Neighborhood FE X
Neighborhood × year FE (θnt) X X
Household characteristics (X ′itγ) X X X X
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered on neighborhoods.
Notes: BEV refers to battery electric vehicles, while ICEV refers to internal combustion engine vehicles. Regression
(1) estimates the triple difference with dummies for “post”, “Bergen”, “paying commuters” and year fixed effects.
Regression (2) adds neighborhood fixed effects, alleviating the need for a “Bergen” dummy. Regression (3) interacts
neighborhood and year fixed effects, alleviating the need for “Bergen×post”. Regression (4) interacts “paying
commuters” with year fixed effects, alleviating the need for “Paying commuter×post”. This is the same regression
as in Equation 2 and Table 5.
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Notes: BEV refers to battery electric vehicles, while ICEV refers to internal combustion engine vehicles. Whisker
plots are triple difference estimates from Equation 2 clustered at the neighborhood level, with an increasing
number of demographic controls. The top estimate of each panel is unconditional on demographics, while the
bottom estimate is the same as in Table 5.
The following variables are added in sequence: (1) single/couple specific first and second order polynomials of
time and distance to work by car; (2) single/couple specific controls for average age and share of females in the
household; (3) number of household members and single/couple specific dummies for kids less than 18 years old
living at home; (4) single/couple specific dummies for education level (the highest education level of spouses); (5)
single/couple specific controls for the share of household members that are employed and retired; (6) single/couple
specific first and second order polynomials of average net income and average wealth; (7) single/couple specific first
and second order polynomials for public transit accessibility to work (time by public transit minus time by car,
and time by public transit divided by time by car); and (8) a dummy variable for whether any household members
own a secondary home.
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D.3 Heterogeneous effects
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Quintiles of work distance
Low income High income
Notes: Figure plots the coefficients βk estimated from equation 4, where groups are defined as interactions between
the top or bottom income quintile (the three middle income quintiles are excluded), and education level (panel a),
age (panel b), quintiles of public transit quality (panel c), or quintiles of work distance (panel d). Whiskers indicate
95 % confidence intervals. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household owns an electric
vehicle in year t and 0 otherwise. Group allocation is household specific and based on 2014 values. Educational
attainment refers to the maximum level observed within the household, income is summed over spouses and other
variables are averaged across spouses. “Public transit quality” relates to the commute, and is measured as the
difference in commute time between driving a private car and public transit. Households in income quintiles 2-4
are dropped from the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level.
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Table D.6: Heterogeneous DiDiD estimates on Pr(BEV)
Dependent variable: Pr(BEV) Estimate for group number:
Measured in percentage points (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Income†
Post × Paying commuters × Bergen -0.247 2.547∗∗∗ 4.282∗∗∗ 4.018∗∗∗ 7.027∗∗∗
(0.716) (0.811) (0.888) (0.984) (0.951)
Mean depvar 2014 0.97 2.31 4.13 6.16 10.46
Mean depvar 2017 4.00 10.11 16.21 22.05 31.49
Household income (1000 NOK) 350.40 521.31 672.00 817.13 1244.59
Households per group 61069 72408 79541 81564 82332
Panel B: Family status††
Post × Paying commuters × Bergen -0.354 0.195 1.676∗∗ 6.637∗∗∗
(0.708) (1.648) (0.749) (0.807)
Mean depvar 2014 1.24 1.59 3.61 8.24
Mean depvar 2017 4.21 8.39 14.02 27.79
Households per group 79150 14203 125064 158497
Panel C: Education‡
Post × Paying commuters × Bergen 1.350 1.472 2.954∗∗∗ 4.924∗∗∗ 4.171∗∗∗
(0.929) (1.019) (0.807) (0.826) (0.983)
Mean depvar 2014 1.66 2.12 3.34 5.99 7.31
Mean depvar 2017 5.90 8.20 14.90 22.24 23.49
Households per group 51147 40605 117360 109901 57901
Panel D: Age†
Post × Paying commuters × Bergen 3.937∗∗∗ 5.041∗∗∗ 5.933∗∗∗ 3.367∗∗∗ 1.099
(0.954) (1.022) (0.964) (0.866) (0.816)
Mean depvar 2014 2.15 6.40 6.97 4.72 3.43
Mean depvar 2017 14.49 22.14 23.19 16.51 11.02
Average age 29.51 37.24 43.81 51.49 61.27
Households per group 61527 73636 80071 82488 79192
Panel E: Work distance†
Post × Paying commuters × Bergen 2.417∗∗ 2.518∗∗ 3.261∗∗∗ 4.638∗∗∗ 5.719∗∗∗
(0.939) (0.991) (0.887) (1.019) (0.996)
Mean depvar 2014 2.93 4.43 5.06 4.95 6.76
Mean depvar 2017 12.95 15.99 18.86 20.20 22.73
Work distance (kilometers) 6.68 8.53 10.85 14.35 24.12
Households per group 72634 75333 75951 76261 76735
Panel F: Public transit†
Post × Paying commuters × Bergen 2.458∗∗∗ 3.515∗∗∗ 4.404∗∗∗ 3.169∗∗∗ 8.404∗∗∗
(0.867) (0.941) (0.854) (1.085) (1.285)
Mean depvar 2014 2.00 4.80 6.06 6.57 7.90
Mean depvar 2017 9.33 16.92 20.17 23.18 28.20
Time public transport minus time car (minutes) 29.58 45.19 60.41 83.67 168.87
Households per group 67481 71827 77013 80418 79952
† Column number refers to quintiles of the population.
†† 1: Single without kids; 2: Single with kids; 3: Couple without kids; 4: Couple with kids.
‡ 1: Unknown; 2: Less than high school; 3: High school; 4: College; 5: University.
Notes: Table shows the coefficient βk estimated from equation 4, where k refers to group (e.g., income quintile).
All coefficients presented in a panel is from the same regression. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the household owns an electric vehicle in year t and 0 otherwise. Note that estimated effects are given in
percentage points. Group allocation is based on 2014 values, which means that households will not move between
groups over time. The sample consists of years 2011-2017, where 2016-2017 denotes the “post” period and 2015
is excluded due to potential for anticipation effects. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Quintiles of public transit quality
Notes: Figure plots the coefficients βk estimated from equation 4, where k refers to group (e.g., income quintile).
Each panel (a-f) plots coefficients estimated from a separate regression. Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals.
The dependent variable is number of internal combustion engine vehicles owned by the household. Groups are based
on 2014 demographics. “Income” is summed over spouses, “education” is the maximum value in each household
and “age”, “work distance” and “public transit quality” are averaged over spouses. Public transit quality is defined
as “time to work by public transit minus time to work by car” in minutes. The sample is restricted to the years
2011-2017, where 2016-2017 denotes the “post” period and 2015 is excluded due to potential anticipation effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level.
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Quintiles of public transit quality
Notes: Figure plots the coefficients βk estimated from equation 4, where k refers to group (e.g., income quintile).
Each panel (a-f) plots coefficients estimates from a separate regression. Whiskers indicate 95% confidence inter-
vals. The dependent variable is the total number of cars owned by the household. Groups are based on 2014
demographics. “Income” is summed over spouses, “education” is the maximum value in each household and “age”,
“work distance” and “public transit quality” are averaged over spouses. Public transit quality is defined as “time
to work by public transit minus time to work by car” in minutes. The sample is restricted to the years 2011-2017,
where 2016-2017 denotes the “post” period and 2015 is excluded due to potential anticipation effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the neighborhood level.
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Appendix E Welfare calculations
In this appendix, we provide more details on the welfare calculations presented in
Section 5.1 in the paper.
E.1 Adaptation costs
Households that continue to drive their diesel or gasoline car through the toll cordon
during rush hours after the policy was implemented will incur a higher private cost
due to higher toll rates. As these payments are simply a transfer to the government,
the impact on aggregate welfare is assumed to be zero. Households that adapt their
behavior to avoid the congestion charge, however, will incur a private adaptation
cost that is welfare-reducing. There are four ways in which this can occur: (1)
not drive at all (e.g., change mode of transportation or work from home), (2) shift
driving to non-rush hours (temporal adaptation), (3) drive around the toll cordon
(spatial adaptation), or (4) buy an electric vehicle.
To quantify the total adaptation costs related to (1)-(3), we combine the esti-
mated reduction in cars passing the toll cordon during rush hours with assumptions
on the adaptation cost per trip. The traffic reduction during rush hours is estimated
to be around 447 cars per 15-minute interval, or 8,046 cars per workday (see Table 2,
Column 2). As an upper bound on adaptation costs per trip, we use the 20 NOK
increase in toll rate during rush hours (from NOK 25 to NOK 45); if the cost of
avoiding the congestion charge was higher than NOK 20, individuals would prefer to
continue to drive through the toll cordon after the implementation of the congestion
charge. As a lower bound on the adaptation costs per trip, we use NOK 0; if an
individual was indifferent to passing the toll cordon during rush hours or not prior to
the policy change, the adaptation costs for this individual will be zero. By assuming
that demand is locally linear between these two extremes, we can apply the standard
triangle formula to calculate the private deadweight loss, 1
2
(p1 − p0)(qcars0 − qcars1 ),
where (p1 − p0) is the maximum adaption cost and (qcars0 − qcars1 ) is the total num-
ber of cars substituting away from the congestion charge (see Figure E.1). Given
230 working days each year, we find an adaptation costs resulting from (1)-(3) of
NOK 18.51 million per year (0.5×NOK 20×8,046 cars per day×230 working
days).61
However, the welfare analysis is complicated by the presence of BEVs and the
fact that they cannot be disentangled from other cars in the traffic data. Individuals
61Note that we simplify these calculations somewhat by focusing on the change in toll road
during rush hours and disregarding the small decrease in toll levels outside rush hours.
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Figure illustrates cars (q) driving through the toll cordon during rush hours as a function of the toll intensity (p).
The number of cars in total during rush hours, which is what we observe for the traffic regressions, is downward
sloping in toll payments. The number of BEVs is upwards sloping. The number of ICEVs, which are required to
pay tolls, is the difference between these two curves. The congestion charge implies increased tolls from p0 to p1
during rush hours, fewer cars in total but additional EVs and a change in total toll payments from p0(qcars0 −qBEVs0 )
to p1(qcars1 − qBEVs1 ).
substituting towards BEVs as a response to the policy will also incur an adaptation
cost ≥ NOK 0 per day (otherwise they would have bought a BEV irrespective of the
congestion charge) and ≤ NOK 20 per day (otherwise they would have continued to
drive an ICEV). To quantify this adaptation cost (4), we again employ the triangle
formula to calculate 1
2
(p1−p0)(qBEVs1 −qBEVs0 ) (see Figure E.1), but rely on estimates
from the individual-level regressions. The regression coefficient in Table 5, Column 1
indicates that 4.2 percent of paying commuters avoided the congestion charge by
purchasing an electric vehicle. We define the population of paying commuters to
be the total number of households were at least one household member works and
lives on opposite sides of the toll cordon, and the work distance is between 5 and
50 kilometers. This gives us a population of 38,482 households.62 Based on our re-
gression estimate, 1,616 households adapted to the policy by purchasing an electric
vehicle (38,482 households×0.042). Assuming 230 working days each year, the pri-
vate adaptation cost amounts to NOK 3.72 million per year (0.5×NOK 20×230
working days×1,616 households).
62Note that this number is higher than the sample size of “paying commuters” in the analysis due
to the sample selection criteria imposed in the regressions. However, we still consider the 38,482
households to be a conservative estimate of the affected population, as the congestion charge also
affects the remaining population of Bergen – although their increased likelihood of purchasing an
electric car is probably smaller than 4.2 percent.
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E.2 Time savings
A key benefit of congestion charging is time savings from reduced congestion. Un-
fortunately, our data lacks a relevant congestion measure such as driving speed or
time spent in traffic, meaning that we are unable to obtain a causal estimate on time
savings. As a second best approach, we apply descriptive estimates of time savings
from other relevant studies. NPRA (2016) reports average time in traffic during
rush hours for the main corridors through the Bergen toll cordon during weekdays
in April 2015 and April 2016. We use these before/after measurements of driving
time, which average out to 2.3 minutes across all corridors, as a proxy for average
time savings. From our detailed driving data, we know that an average of 51,534
cars per day drive through the toll cordon during rush hours on weekdays post policy
implementation. To convert this to monetary units, we use a recent Norwegian time
value study (Flügel et al., 2020), where the time value for commuting car drivers
is estimated to NOK 93 per hour by means of stated preference experiments. Note
that this number is significantly lower than the average net wage in Norway, which
is often used as an opportunity cost for time spent in traffic in other studies. We
also disregard time savings for passengers. Our calculations will hence give us a
conservative estimate of the time savings induced by the policy. Given 230 working
days per year, the value of the time savings amounts to NOK 42.26 million an-
nually (51,534 cars per day×2.3 minutes per car÷60 minutes per hour×NOK 93
per hour×230 working days).
E.3 Local pollutants
To quantify social benefits of lower local pollution, we combine our estimates on
changes in ambient levels of NO2 and PM10 with assumptions about the affected
population and estimates on social benefits per µg/m3 in the existing literature.
From Table 3, Column 1, we find that the congestion charge led to a reduction in
daily average levels of NO2 and PM10 of 3.064 and 1.185 µg/m
3, respectively.63 As
we only observe concentrations of local air pollutants at a single monitoring station
(Danmarks plass - see Figure 1), we have limited ability to examine the spatial dis-
persion of pollutants. Given that our one monitoring station is located at the border
of the inner city center of Bergen, we opt for a conservative approach and define the
inhabitants of the inner city center as the affected population (29,287 individuals).64
63Note that while our estimated effect of changes in PM10 concentrations is economically sig-
nificant, the daily estimate is not statistically significant and should therefore be interpreted with
caution.
64As a point of comparison, there are around 70,000 individuals living within the borders of the
Bergen toll cordon and around 270,000 individuals living in the municipality of Bergen.
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In reality, individuals working in the city center of Bergen as well as those living in
close proximity to the main roads running through the toll cordon are also likely to
be affected by the air quality improvements.65
Next, we need to provide an estimate of the social costs of air pollution. A
growing literature has documented a wide range of channels through which air pol-
lution has adverse effects on societal outcomes, such as low birth weight (Currie
and Walker, 2011), respiratory diseases (Jans et al., 2018), lower productivity in
both physical and high-skilled work (Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2012; Chang et al.,
2016; Ebenstein et al., 2016; Archsmith et al., 2018), criminal activity (Bondy et al.,
2020), etc. Factoring in all these different channels, and adapting them to our re-
search context, is not necessarily straight forward. E.g., the effect of exposure to
one µg/m3 may be non-linear and depend on the average level of air pollution, and
the outcome reported in studies is not necessarily measured in monetary units. In
this analysis, we rely on a recent Norwegian report providing estimates of the social
costs of one additional individual being exposed to 1 µg/m3 of NO2 and PM10 over
the course of one year (Rødseth et al., 2019). Taking into account a wide range
of short- and long-term effects related to e.g., respiratory diseases, cardiovascular
diseases, and excess mortality, the study gives cost estimates of NOK 160 per µg/m3
of NO2 and NOK 738 per µg/m
3 of PM10. As the congestion charge is not active
during weekends, we scale these estimates by the share of working days (230/365).
Note that the cost estimates only cover some of the channels by which air pollution
may have adverse effects, and should therefore be seen as conservative estimates.
Based on the estimates and assumptions outlined above, we quantify an annual
social benefit of NOK 9.05 million for NO2 and NOK 16.14 million for PM10.
E.4 Global pollutants
The two most important parameters for determining the benefit of CO2 reductions
are the social cost of CO2 and the average CO2 intensity of (non-electric and elec-
tric) cars. Relying on estimates from Rødseth et al. (2019), we assume a social cost
of carbon of NOK 508 per metric ton of CO2 (∼$ 61). When quantifying the CO2
intensity of non-electric cars, we focus on the direct emissions from fuel combustion.
As a measure of the CO2 intensity, we use the average intensity of the passenger
car fleet of non-electric vehicles in Norway in 2018 (149 gCO2/km) (Rødseth et al.,
65Due to lack of data, we are not able to measure ambient air quality along the routes around the
city center where we see increased traffic. Our welfare calculations hence do not take into account
a potential worsening of air quality in these areas. At the same time, the routes around the city
center are generally less congested and have a lower population density - both suggesting a lower
social cost of traffic.
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2019). When quantifying the CO2 intensity of electric cars, we consider the indi-
rect emissions related to electricity production. As 95% of Norway’s electricity is
produced from hydropower, we simplify calculations somewhat by assuming a zero
CO2 intensity for electric vehicles.
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To quantify changes in CO2 emissions induced by the congestion charge, we
consider three different channels. First, the congestion charge led to lower CO2
emissions due to lower traffic volumes. As the congestion charge did not change
driving costs for electric vehicles, we can safely assume that the reduction in daily
traffic volume measured at the toll gates (7,456 cars per day; see Table 2, Column 1),
as well as the increase in daily driving around the toll gate (1,054 cars per day; see
Table B.5, Column 1), are explained by non-electric cars. Combined, these numbers
indicate the net total reduction in cars on the relevant road sections around Bergen
per working day. As a proxy for trip length, we use the average work-home distance
from the register data (12.37 kilometers). Given 230 working days per year, this
amounts to about 36 million fewer kilometers driven annually. Given the assume
CO2 intensity and social cost, this translates to NOK 2.76 million per year.
Second, we take into account that the trips around the toll cordon are longer. Of
the 1,054 additional trips per working day, 136 are in the north-south direction while
918 are in the south-west direction. Since the north-south route is 4.1 kilometers
longer and the north-south route is 3.5 kilometers longer, we estimate that the spatial
adaptation increased driving by 0.867 million kilometers annually, which translates
to a social cost of NOK 0.066 million per year.
Third, and importantly, households adapted to the policy by acquiring an electric
car. As explained above, we assume a zero CO2 emission intensity for electric cars.
To simplify the exposition, we assume that the electric cars induced by the policy
replaced non-electric cars 1-to-1. This assumption is in line with our findings in
Table 5, which indicates that the increase in electric vehicle ownership is very similar
in magnitude to the decrease in non-electric car ownership, resulting in a net zero
effect on total car ownership. According to Statistics Norway, a passenger car in
Hordaland county (where Bergen is located) was driven 11,680 kilometers per year
on average in 2016, and according to Section E.1 the congestion charge led 1616
66Note that the CO2 intensity of the electricity consumed in Norway is exceptionally low also
when taking into account electricity imports from other countries. In 2019, the CO2 inten-
sity of consumed electricity in Norway was estimated to around 17g CO2e/kWh; see nve.no/
energiforsyning/kraftproduksjon/hvor-kommer-strommen-fra/. By comparison, the aver-
age CO2 intensity of electricity from coal power plants in Europe was around 900g CO2/kWh in
2019; see IEA (2020). Note that we simplify calculations by disregarding equilibrium price effects
on international markets for power and CO2 quotas. We also disregard indirect CO2 emissions
related to the production and scrapping of cars.
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households in Bergen to acquire electric cars. This translates to about 19 million
kilometers annually, with a monetary value of around NOK 1.43 million per year
due to lower CO2 emissions. Note that we disregard second-order equilibrium effects
working through the second-hand car market.
Combining the three sources of changes in CO2 emissions gives an annual social
benefit of NOK 4.12 million per year.67
E.5 Assumptions and estimates
Table E.1 gives an overview of all values used in the welfare calculation, including
references where appropriate.
Table E.1: Assumptions and estimates used in welfare calculations
Description Source Value
Panel A: Adaptation costs
Congestion charge (additional NOK per trip during rush hours) Table 1 20
Working days per year Norwegian average 230
Change in the number of cars during rush hours per day Table 2, Column 2 -8,046
Paying commuting households exposed Register data 38,482
Probability of acquiring electric car due to exposure (percent) Table 5, Column 1 4.2
Panel B: Time savings
Average time savings during rush hours (minutes per car) NPRA (2016), pg. 14 2.3
Cars affected (cars per day during rush post policy) Traffic data 51,534
Value of time for drivers (NOK per hour) Flügel et al. (2020), pg. 59 93
Number of passengers per car Conservative assumption 0
Panel C: Local pollutants
∆NO2 (µg/m3) Table 3, Column 1 3.06
∆PM10 (µg/m3) Table 3, Column 1 1.19
Cost per year per individual per µg/m3 of NO2 exposure (NOK) Rødseth et al. (2019), pg. 23 160
Cost per year per individual per µg/m3 of PM10 exposure (NOK) Rødseth et al. (2019), pg. 22 738
Population exposed to lower air pollution Register data 29,287
Panel D: Global pollutants
Cost per tonne of CO2 (NOK) Rødseth et al. (2019), pg. 17 508
Average CO2 intensity of non-electric cars (g CO2/km) Rødseth et al. (2019), pg. 31 149
Average CO2 intensity of electric cars (g CO2/km) 0
Average driving per car per year (kilometers) Statistics Norway* 11,680
Average work distance (kilometers) Register data 12.37
Change in the number of cars passing the toll cordon (cars/day) Table 2, Column 1 -7,456
Additional cars driving around, north-south direction (cars/day) Table B.5, Column 1 135.6
Additional cars driving around, south-west direction (cars/day) Table B.5, Column 1 908.5
Additional trip length, north-south direction (kilometers) Google maps 4.1
Additional trip length, south-west direction (kilometers) Google maps 3.5
* Number reflects the average of all passenger cars registered in Hordaland county in 2016, publicly accessible at:
https://www.ssb.no/statbank/table/12576/tableViewLayout1/ (accessed August, 2020).
67Note that this figure is based on the exact calculations rather than the three rounded numbers
given above.
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E.6 Additional calculations for private costs
Table E.2: Vehicle prices (NOK)
Prod. price VAT Reg. tax MSRP
Compact cars
VW Golf Sportsvan (gasoline) 196,456 49,114 73,230 318,800
Nissan Leaf (electric) 245,090 0 0 245,090
Luxury cars
BMW 640i xDrive Coupe (gasoline) 505,434 126,358 503,007 1,134,800
Tesla Model S (electric) 655,000 0 0 655,000
Notes: This table displays prices in NOK for the modal compact electric car (Nissan Leaf, battery range
≈ 240 km) and the modal luxury electric car (Tesla Model S, battery range ≈ 460 km) in 2016, as well
as comparable gasoline cars with similar engine effects. The last column is the manufacturer’s suggested re-
tail price (MSRP), publicly accessible at: https://www.skatteetaten.no/globalassets/tabeller-og-satser/
listepris-bil/bilpriser-2016.pdf (accessed August, 2020). Based on the MSRP and national tax rates, we
have backed out the producer’s price excluding taxes, the VAT and the registration tax for the gasoline cars. Both
tax components are zero for BEVs. 10 NOK ≈ 1 EUR and ≈ 1.2 USD.
Table E.3: Annual private ownership costs
(1) (2) (3)
Cost element New BEV New ICEV Used ICEV
Ownership costs
Purchase price/value (NOK) 245,090 318,080 50,000
Annual depreciation rate (share) 0.12 0.12 0.12
Annual depr. cost, 5 year avg. (NOK) 23,150 30,112 4,723
Ownership tax (NOK) 445 3,135 3,135
Annual ownership cost (NOK) 23,595 33,246 7,858
Driving costs
Driving (km) 11,680 11,680 11,680
Cost per kilometer (NOK) 0.16 0.68 0.76
Annual driving cost (NOK) 1,869 7,942 8,877
Toll payments
Annual toll payments (NOK) 0 9,900 9,900
Value of other BEV incentives
Free parking (NOK) -2,349 0 0
Reduced ferry rates (NOK) -579 0 0
Bus line time savings (NOK) -4,498 0 0
Annual sum of incentives (NOK) -7,426 0 0
Total annual cost (NOK) 18,037 51,206 30,605
Notes: This table presents simplified calculations of the annual cost of car ownership for three different cars; a
new Nissan Leaf (column 1), a new Volkswagen Golf Sportsvan (column 2), and a comparable 10-12 year old small
gasoline car (column 3). See Table E.2 for different price components. We assume a depreciation of 12 % per year,
and calculate annual depreciation as the average annual value loss over a five year period. Kilometers driven is
from Table E.1, while price per kilometer is based on Norwegian gasoline and kWh prices and fuel/energy efficiency
of compact cars. Annual toll payments is for paying commuters in Bergen when the congestion charge is active,
assuming a household member drives to work each day (45 NOK×220 days). The annual value of other BEV
incentives are based on a national survey among BEV owners in Norway; see Figenbaum and Kolbenstvedt (2016),
p. 53 for details. We disregard service, maintenance and insurance costs, which are not necessarily differentiated
by propulsion systems but positively correlated with the age of the car. 10 NOK ≈ 1 EUR and ≈ 1.2 USD.
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